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Local governments play a critical role in American society and
construct much of the infrastructure upon which we rely, frequently financing
this infrastructure by borrowing. Local government borrowing is likely to
play a significant role in the building and improving of infrastructure as we
look for ways to revive the economy and move beyond the COVID-19
pandemic. This article discusses some of the typical provisions of state laws
governing this borrowing and suggests some ways these laws could be
revised to provide appropriate flexibility to local governments while
protecting current and future residents. Because states have varying
priorities, values, and government structures, it does not propose a single
solution, but rather identifies key components of these laws and presents
considerations, alternatives and recommendations for each component. It
also proposes alternative ways to improve bond laws in an effort to begin a
conversation about this important topic.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the important role that
local governments play in our lives, thrusting county public health officials
into the spotlight and causing us to turn to them and to other local officials to
keep us safe. But local governments have long played a critical role in
American society, providing services and facilities on which we rely, such as
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, fire and police protection, clean water,
sewers, solid waste collection, electricity, airports, ports, and public
transportation. Some local governments have transformed their regions with
public transportation projects, bridges, stadiums, and other infrastructure
projects. Local governments built the Golden Gate Bridge, the Los Angeles
Aqueduct, and the Brooklyn Bridge. 1
1

The Golden Gate Bridge was built by a local authority formed by six counties. Special
District Formed, GOLDEN GATE B RIDGE HIGHWAY & T RANSP . DIST .,
https://www.goldengate.org/bridge/history-research/bridge-construction/special-districtformed/ [https://perma.cc/88PJ-ESVG]. Over 40 million vehicles cross the Golden Gate
Bridge every year. Annual Vehicle Crossings and Toll Revenues, GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE
HIGHWAY & TRANSP. DIST., https://www.goldengate.org/bridge/history-research/statistics-
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State and local governments build and preserve much of the nation’s
public infrastructure (considerably more than the federal government does). 2
They borrow hundreds of billions of dollars annually to do so, usually in the
form of long-term debt securities referred to as “municipal bonds.”3 Local
governments are likely to play a critical role in moving past COVID-19 and
the economic crisis it has created, and municipal bonds will be an essential
tool for doing so.

data/annual-vehicle-crossings-toll-revenues/ [https://perma.cc/J7P2-EN3S]. The Los
Angeles Aqueduct was built by the City of Los Angeles, and some credit it with the dramatic
growth of the city (albeit at great cost to the Owens Valley, from which the water for the city
was acquired). See ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S.
FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 71 (1996) (noting that areas that wished to
receive water had to agree to be annexed to the city and citing an expansion of the city from
43 to 422 square miles between 1906 and 1930); LES STANDIFORD, WATER TO THE ANGELS:
WILLIAM MULHOLLAND, HIS MONUMENTAL AQUEDUCT, AND THE RISE OF LOS ANGELES
xviii (2015) (suggesting that the man responsible for the construction of the aqueduct had
“made such a place as Los Angeles possible”). The cities of Brooklyn (then a separate city)
and New York both contributed to the financing and construction of the Brooklyn Bridge.
See People ex rel. Murphy v. Kelly, 76 N.Y. 475, 480–87 (1879) (describing the cities’
involvement during the early stages of construction); City Pays Off Brooklyn Bridge of 1883;
Interest Was Double Cost of Erecting It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1956, at 25, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/1956/11/03/archives/city-pays-off-brooklyn-bridge-of-1883interest-was-double-cost-of.html (noting that New York City had made its final debt service
payment on bonds issued to construct the Brooklyn Bridge). In 2016, an average of over
100,000 vehicles crossed the Brooklyn Bridge each day. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2016
NEW YORK CITY BRIDGE TRAFFIC VOLUMES 61 (2018).
2
State and local governments put in place approximately $313.6 billion of new nonresidential construction and improvements in 2021, compared to $23.6 billion of similar
projects put in place by the federal government. Annual Value of Federal Construction Put
in Place 2012-2021 and Annual Value of State and Local Construction Put in Place 20122021, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/construction/c30/historical_data.html
[https://perma.cc/U6AD-HXNC] (providing the cited financial information in spreadsheet
files entitled “Annual,” “2012-2021,” “State and Local” [https://perma.cc/LQV8-JZPA] and
“Federal” [https://perma.cc/8USH-BR2U]).
3
See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2021 CAPITAL MARKETS FACT BOOK 17 (2021)
(indicating that state and local governments issued $484.5 billion in long-term bonds in
2020); Andrew J. Ceresney’s keynote address at Securities Enforcement Forum 2016:
[I]f your children attend a public school or a university; if you have been
treated at a local hospital; if you have visited a library, park or sports
facility; if your parents reside in an assisted living facility; if you took the
subway, or drove on roads or bridges or through a tunnel today; even if
you turned on your tap water this morning, you are likely seeing the
tangible results and benefits of the municipal securities marketplace.
Andrew J. Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at
Securities Enforcement Forum 2016: The Impact of SEC Enforcement on Public Finance
(Oct. 13, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-ceresney10132016.html [https://perma.cc/AFU3-RF4T].
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Most states have constitutional and/or statutory restrictions on the
amount and terms of debt that local governments within their borders may
issue.4 These restrictions are intended to serve a variety of purposes,
including promoting fiscally sound decision-making, reducing the risk of
default, preventing excessive burdens on taxpayers, and promoting
interperiod equity (the concept that the burden of paying for a facility should
be spread fairly over period during which the facility is used).5
Because of the critical role that local government borrowing plays in
the development of public infrastructure and likely will play in the recovery
from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and because of the volume of
this borrowing, it is essential that the laws that govern local government
borrowing (referred to herein as “bond laws”) are clear and coherent, and that
they set reasonable parameters while also providing sufficient flexibility to
allow local governments to borrow in the most efficient way possible even as
market conditions change. Unfortunately, not all existing bond laws meet
these standards. This article discusses a range of existing bond laws and
proposes improvements. Because states have varying priorities, values, and
government structures, because state constitutions contain a variety of
restrictions on local government borrowing that may be difficult to change,
and because the types of bonds vary somewhat from state to state, this article
does not propose a single solution for all states or all bonds. Rather, it
See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., M-186, STATE LAWS
GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 10 (1993) (describing
the prevalence of several types of restrictions, including debt limits, voter approval
requirements, restrictions on the purposes for which debt can be used, maximum interest
rates and maximum terms); James E. Spiotto, The Role of the State in Supervising and
Assisting Municipalities, Especially in Times of Financial Distress, MUN. FIN. J. 1, 6–8
(2013) (discussing the limits states have placed on debt municipalities may issue and noting
that all states except three have a limit on local government debt); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal
Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1255 (2009) (“Virtually every state constitution
imposes limits on the amount of debt that its political subdivisions can issue in order to fund
capital projects . . . .”).
5
See, e.g., James A. Coniglio on the issue of constitutional municipal debt limitations:
The traditional objective of constitutional debt limitations has been to
prevent municipalities from improvidently contracting debts for other than
ordinary current expenses of administration, and to restrict their borrowing
capacity, and to prevent the creation of excessive debt, the carrying
charges of which would fall on current revenues, and the principal on
posterity.
James A. Coniglio, Chapter 1: Borrowing Authority of State and Local Governments, in 1
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 1.3, (2d ed.) (database updated Nov.
2020); Gillette, supra note 4, at 1256 (discussing the reasons debt limitations were created,
including protecting taxpayers and promoting interperiod equity); Spiotto, supra note 4, at
10 (identifying prevention of financial crises and defaults as a reason for the imposition of
debt limits). The reasons states have laws concerning local government borrowing are
discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3.
4
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identifies key components of laws governing municipal bonds and presents
considerations, alternatives, and recommendations for each component. It is
intended to start a thoughtful conversation about what modifications to bond
laws would be desirable and achievable.
Following this introduction (Part 1), Part 2 of this article provides a
brief overview of municipal bonds and Part 3 briefly describes the laws
governing them and highlights some of the problems with these laws.
Part 4 identifies and discusses the aims to be achieved by improved
bond laws. One key objective of these laws should be providing appropriate
flexibility for local governments to innovate, make decisions and adapt to
changing circumstances while protecting citizens (including future citizens)
from poor decisions made by local governments. A second critical objective
is ensuring that citizens have the opportunity to be aware of and involved in
local government borrowing decisions. These objectives are more likely to
be achieved if different types of borrowing and different local governments
are treated the same way unless there are clear reasons not to do so; legislation
is not unduly complicated; and laws are flexible enough that local
governments can adapt to changing market conditions.
Parts 5-7 each address different aspects of bond laws. Part 5 addresses
restrictions on the ability to issue debt. Part 6 covers laws regulating bonds,
including those relating to the use of proceeds, restrictions on terms of bonds
such as maturity, amortization, and interest rate, and on the process of selling
bonds. Part 7 focuses on the process for governing boards to approve bonds,
information requirements, and opportunities for community involvement.
Each section discusses some existing approaches to bond laws and
alternatives.
While it might be ideal for a state to adopt one cohesive set of laws
for the issuance of municipal bonds, this may not be a realistic political
option. Therefore, Part 8 discusses ways to improve state bond laws short of
wholesale revision. These improvements can still provide great benefit to
local governments that issue bonds and, more important, to their citizens.
2. AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL BONDS
2.1. Overview
“Municipal bonds” generally refers to debt securities issued by state
or local governments.6 However, this article focuses on securities issued by

6

Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Municipal Bond, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
https://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/MUNICIPAL-BOND.aspx [https://perma.cc/
9NSE-KP4P].
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local governments and uses the term to refer to that debt. 7 There are more
than 90,000 local governments in the United States.8 Many local governments
have overlapping territory. For example, a piece of property could be within
a county, a city, a school district and one or more other special districts. 9
Local governments issue bonds primarily to finance capital projects
and to refinance existing debt,10 though they are sometimes issued for other
purposes. They typically (though not always) have a maturity of more than

While the term “bonds” typically refers only to debt securities sold to the public, for
simplicity’s sake in this article it also refers to borrowing from financial institutions.
8
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FROM MUNICIPALITIES TO SPECIAL DISTRICTS, OFFICIAL COUNT OF
EVERY TYPE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 2017 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 2 (2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2019/econ/from_munici
palities_to_special_districts_america_counts_october_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2PM6TKE]. Counties, municipalities and townships provide general governmental services, such
as courts, jails, law enforcement, public health, welfare, hospitals, airports, streets and
highways, parks, libraries and environmental protection within a particular area. Definitions:
Local Purpose Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/
cspan/govts/20120301_cspan_govts_def_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9HJ-595U];
U.S.
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 4, at 1. These are sometimes
referred to as “general governments.” Special districts are created for a more limited purpose
or purposes, such as fire protection, transportation, water supply or parks. Id. at 2-3; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, at 2–5.
9
See, e.g., CTY. OF MONTEREY, MONTEREY COUNTY TAX RATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020-21
(2021), available at https://www.co.monterey.ca.us/home/showpublisheddocument?id=
98164 [https://perma.cc/4CTN-62X6] (identifying the cities, redevelopment agencies,
school districts, community colleges, county services areas, water resources agency and
other special districts within the county and showing the overlap between various local
governments in the county); SAN JUAN UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $30,000,000 GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS, ELECTION OF 2012, SERIES 2020, $150,000,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION
BONDS, ELECTION OF 2016, SERIES 2020 & $143,090,000 2020 GENERAL OBLIGATION
REFUNDING BONDS (FEDERALLY TAXABLE) OFFICIAL STATEMENT 30 (Oct. 15, 2020),
available at https://emma.msrb.org/P21409591-P11111346-P11521176.pdf [https://perma.
cc/46NV-7TMR] (identifying the various debt issued by other local governments that have
territory overlapping with all or part of the district, including a community college district,
park district, county, cities and other special districts); THE CNTY. OF COOK, ILL.
$101,820,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS, SERIES 2018 OFFICIAL
STATEMENT 29 (Jan. 18, 2018), available at https://emma.msrb.org/ER1119813-ER875890ER1276531.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NJZ-X9AC] (identifying debt of other local governments
with territory overlapping that of the county, including a city, board of education, park
district, community college system, water reclamation district and forest preserve district).
10
GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1, 6 (2018). State and local
governments also issue shorter term debt, typically referred to as “notes.” Glossary of
Municipal Securities Terms: Note, M UN. SEC. R ULEMAKING B D., http://www.msrb.org/
Glossary/Definition/NOTE.aspx [https://perma.cc/PVE2-PFM4]. While short-term debt is
not the focus of this article and is not addressed in the proposed framework for laws
governing municipal bonds, some of the principles discussed also apply to short-term debt.
7
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three years;11 many bonds have a significantly longer term, frequently up to
thirty years and sometimes even longer.
Municipal bonds are issued in a face amount (also referred to as a
“principal amount” or a “par amount”) that is payable upon maturity or earlier
prepayment.12 Municipal bonds may bear interest at a rate that does not
change (a “fixed rate bond”) or at a rate that changes periodically based on
market conditions or a predetermined index (a “variable rate bond”). 13
Interest is paid by the issuer of the bond to the purchaser of the bond, usually
semiannually for fixed rate bonds. 14
Municipal bonds are sometimes (in my experience, usually) sold at a
price lower or higher than their face amount (at a “discount” or “premium,”
respectively).15 Thus, the amount received by the issuer from the sale may be
lower or higher than the principal amount of the bonds sold, and the rate of
return for the investor may be higher or lower than the interest rate on the
bonds. Municipal bonds are typically sold to investors based on the “yield”
of the bond, the annual rate of return taking into account not only the interest
rate on the bond but also any discount or premium. 16 Discounts and premiums
can make bonds more attractive to investors. 17 For example, some
11

Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Bond, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/BOND.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8B9J-DCEU];
Short Term or Short Term Range, M UN. SEC. R ULEMAKING B D., http://www.msrb.org/
Glossary/Definition/SHORT-TERM-OR-SHORT-TERM-RANGE.aspx [https://perma.cc/
NF2C-NRGP].
12
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Principal, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/PRINCIPAL.aspx [https://perma.cc/VZJ3 SZCW]. For discussion of prepayment (also referred to as redemption) provisions, see infra
text accompanying notes 33-35.
13
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 8 (2012);
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Fixed Rate, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://www.msrb.org/glossary/definition/fixed-rate.aspx [https://perma.cc/NMK8-95W3];
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Variable Rate, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://www.msrb.org/glossary/definition/variable-rate.aspx [https://perma.cc/AL2Z-49ZH].
14
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Interest Payment Date, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING
B D., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/INTEREST-PAYMENT-DATE.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9U2Z-3URK]. Sometimes interest is added to principal and itself bears
interest until it is paid at or near maturity. Bonds that accrete interest in this matter are
referred to as capital appreciation bonds and are discussed in detail in Heather G. White,
Getting Local Governments Where They Need to Go Without Taxing Taxpayers for a Ride:
“CABs,” Why They Are Used, and What Can Be Done to Prevent Their Misuse, 49 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 363 (2018).
15
The Underwriting Process, M UN. SEC. R ULEMAKING B D., http://msrb.org/Education
Center/Municipal-Market/Lifecycle/Primary/Underwriting-Process.aspx [https://perma.cc/
3FDR-XPC5] (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
16
Id., NEIL O’HARA, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL
BONDS 281 (6th ed. 2012) (definition of “yield”).
17
O’HARA, supra note 16, at 82.
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institutional investors prefer to buy long-term bonds that are priced at a
premium.18
Bonds are usually issued in a group (referred to as a series) with
different maturities.19 Sometimes a single issuance consists of more than one
series, particularly when the bonds being issued have different
characteristics, such as being issued for different purposes or having different
tax-exempt status.20
Principal of each bond is typically paid at maturity or over a period of
years leading up to maturity. 21 However, because bonds are usually issued in
a series with multiple maturities, principal payments are typically made over
the life of a series of bonds, though the amount of such payments may vary
from year to year.
2.2. Payment Sources and Security for Municipal Bonds
Principal and interest on municipal bonds may be payable from a
single source or a combination of sources, such as property taxes, sales taxes
or other taxes, the local government issuer’s general fund, or revenues from
a particular project, such as a utility system or an airport. 22 Bonds payable
from property taxes and/or from all legally available funds of the issuer are
referred to as “general obligation bonds.” 23 Bonds payable from a particular
revenue stream, such as a sales tax, hotel tax or other tax, revenues generated
by a particular project or enterprise, or rent payments made on particular
18

Bond Pricing—The Problem with Premium Pricing, WM FIN. STRAT.,
http://www.munibondadvisor.com/PremiumPricing.htm [https://perma.cc/Y8HM-Q5CA]
(last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
19
See Andrew Ang & Richard C. Green, Lowering Borrowing Costs for States and
Municipalities through CommonMuni, HAMILTON PROJ . 10, (Feb. 2011),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/THP_ANGGREEN_DiscusPape_Feb2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA3H-WXNS] (“Since 1995, the
average municipal bond series has contained thirteen separate bonds, with the top 5 percent
of bond series comprising more than twenty-five separate bonds.”)
20
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Issue, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://www.msrb.org/glossary/definition/issue.aspx [https://perma.cc/9QBW-Q3Q4] (last
visited Mar. 19, 2022).
21
Payment of principal over a period of years leading up to maturity is referred to as
“mandatory sinking fund redemption.” Payments are allocated to investors by lot. O’HARA,
supra note 16, at 273.
22
This article provides only a general overview of the types of local government debt. For
additional detail, see generally Robert S. Amdursky, Clayton P. Gillette & G. Allen Bass,
MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE §§ 1.3, 4.4–4.12, 4.14 (2nd ed.,
2020-2 Cum. Sup.); CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC NO. 19.05, CALIFORNIA
DEBT FINANCING GUIDE ch. 3 (2019).
23
NAT ’L ASS ’N OF B OND LAWYERS , GENERAL OBLIGATION B ONDS : STATE LAW,
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS i–ii (2014).
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property, or from a combination of such sources, are called “revenue
bonds.”24 Some revenue bonds, called “lease revenue bonds,” are paid from
rent under a lease; in some circumstances that lease is from the local
government issuer to another local government, and the rent is payable from
all legally available funds of the renting local government. 25 Some bonds are
hybrid in nature, payable primarily from a stream of revenues or, if that
stream is not sufficient, from property taxes. 26
Payment of principal and interest and on some municipal bonds is
guaranteed by a bank or a bond insurer.27 Sometimes, issuers establish a
reserve fund from which funds can be drawn to pay debt service if other funds
are not available.28
2.3. Federal and State Tax Exemption
The U.S. federal government and state governments subsidize most
local government borrowing. The federal government reduces the cost to
state and local governments of issuing debt by making interest earnings on
most of such debt (referred to as “tax-exempt debt” or “tax-exempt bonds”)
exempt from federal income tax. 29 Tax-exempt debt typically bears interest
at a lower rate than taxable debt of identical credit quality because lenders
receive the benefit of tax exemption. 30 Interest on most state and local

24

See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 1.3.4 (describing a variety of revenue bonds).
Some revenue bonds are payable solely from loan payments or lease payments made by a
nongovernmental borrower in what is referred to as a “conduit financing.” CAL. DEBT & INV.
ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 3.3.9. These financings are beyond the scope of this
article. These financings allow nongovernmental entities to take advantage of the lower
interest rates on tax-exempt bonds (see infra Section 2.3).
25
See CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 3.6.1 (describing financing
leases and noting that sometimes the leased property is owned by the renting local
government, which leases the property to the lessor and then subleases it back). Certificates
of participation have a similar structure to lease revenue bonds. Id. at § 3.6.3. They are not
addressed separately in this article.
26
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 1.3.4.
27
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 10-11. For more information regarding bond
insurance, letters of credit and other support, see CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N,
supra note 22, at § 2.3.2.
28
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 2.4.4.
29
In 2011, 90.6% of state and local government securities were issued on a tax-exempt basis.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 11. In 2017, the loss of federal tax revenue resulting
from the exemption from income of interest on public purpose tax-exempt bonds was $28.6
billion. DRIESSEN, supra note 10, at 3.
30
See DRIESSEN, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that investors are willing to receive a lower
interest rate on tax-exempt bonds because their returns after taxes are the same as if they had
received interest at a higher rate but had to pay taxes on the interest).
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government debt is also exempt from home state taxation. 31 Tax-exempt
bonds are subject to extensive requirements under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 and related regulations. 32
2.4. Other Provisions
Sometimes, the local government issuing bonds may have the option
to prepay them or may be obligated to do so upon the occurrence of specified
events or on a predetermined schedule. 33 Such prepayment is referred to as
“redemption”. While these provisions vary, issuers often have a right to elect
to redeem bonds without paying a premium approximately ten years after the
date the bonds were issued.34 Bondholders, particularly those holding
variable rate bonds, may have the right to require the issuer to repurchase
their bonds at certain times or under specified circumstances. 35
The terms of municipal bonds are contained in bond resolutions,
indentures, trust agreements or other agreements, which generally also
contain provisions regarding (among other things) the use of proceeds of the
bonds, the security and source of payment for the bonds, terms of a reserve
fund (if any), events of default, remedies, and covenants of the issuer. 36
Local governments sometimes enter into interest rate swaps
(agreements to exchange periodic interest payments, for example with one
party making payments at a fixed interest rate and the other at a variable rate)
and other derivative arrangements in connection with their bonds. 37 Local
governments use these for a variety of reasons, including attempting to
manage exposure to interest rate risk, better matching assets and liabilities,
endeavoring to reduce net interest costs, generating cash and locking in
current interest rates.38 However, swaps entail risks to local governments,
including the potential that the local government could have to make a
substantial payment if the agreement is terminated (even if the termination is
31

Daniela Pylypczak-Wasylyszyn, Are Municipal Bonds Exempt from State Taxes?,
M UNICIPALBONDS .COM (June 24, 2015), http://www.municipalbonds.com/taxeducation/tax-exemption-from-state-income-taxes [https://perma.cc/R66H-4KX7]; Nadav
Shoked, Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1239, 1289–90 (2017).
32
For a description of some key requirements, see generally CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY
COMM’N, supra note 22, at ch. 4. These regulations are not addressed in this article except
where relevant to discussion of state bond laws.
33
See id. at § 2.3.1 (describing common redemption provisions).
34
Id. at § 2.3.1.3.
35
See id. at § 3.4.2.2 (describing variable rate bonds with a tender feature).
36
See id. at § 2.4 (describing a variety of provisions included in bond documents).
37
JUSTIN MARLOWE, WILLIAM C. RIVENBARK & A. JOHN VOGT, CAPITAL BUDGETING AND
FINANCE 200 (2009); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 8.
38
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 2.3.3; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
supra note 13, at 8.
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through no fault of the local government), that the counterparty will not be
able to meet its obligations, and that as market conditions change the interest
received will not align with the interest rate the issuer pays on the hedged
obligation.39
2.5. Issuance and Sale of Bonds
Newly issued municipal bonds may be sold publicly or privately.
Most municipal bonds are sold publicly, but a growing portion are sold
privately to financial institutions. 40 Public sales are made through an
investment bank acting as an underwriter in either a competitive or negotiated
sale.41 In a competitive sale, the issuer solicits bids to purchase the bonds and
sells them to the underwriter that offers the lowest interest cost on the
bonds.42 In a negotiated sale, the issuer selects an underwriter to purchase the
bonds on negotiated terms. 43 Regardless of which method of public sale is
used, the underwriter then sells the bonds to investors.44
Issuers prepare offering documents that are used by underwriters in
selling newly issued municipal bond and provide updates to certain
information annually as long as the bonds are outstanding.45
Local governments issuing bonds engage lawyers to serve as bond
counsel; the primary role of these lawyers is to provide an expert opinion as
to the validity and the tax-exempt status of the bonds.46 Increasingly, issuers
also engage lawyers as disclosure counsel to assist them in complying with
their disclosure obligations under federal securities laws.47
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 2.3.3.
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 15-16 (noting that in 2011, 54.4% of
municipal securities issuances were sold in negotiated sales, 42.2% in competitive sales and
3.2% in private placements, and that private placements had increased from $3 billion in
2010 to $15 billion in 2011); Benji Nguyen et al., Risky Business: Bank Loans to Local
Governments, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y RSCH. 1 (Aug. 2017) (noting that private
bank loans to local governments in California increased from $49 billion to $91 billion over
a four-year period).
41
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 15. For discussion of the reasons to use each
method of sale, see infra the text accompanying notes 282-284.
42
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 17; Jun Peng et al., Method of Sale in the
Municipal Bond Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 51, 52 (Sylvan G.
Feldstein & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 2008).
43
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 16; Peng, supra note 42, at 52.
44
Id. at 15.
45
For a brief discussion of the legal requirements imposed on underwriters with respect to
offering documents and ongoing disclosure, see Heather G. White, A Little Help from Our
Friends: Moving Beyond Enforcement to Improve State and Local Government Compliance
with Federal Securities Laws, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 147–50 (2019).
46
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 13, at 47.
47
Id. at 48.
39
40
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In addition, local governments often engage an external advisor
(referred to as a “municipal advisor” or “financial advisor”) to assist in
developing a financing plan, advising on the method of sale and assessing
alternative financing strategies, among other things.48 Municipal advisors
have a fiduciary duty towards their local government clients.49
3. STATE REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL BONDS
3.1. Local Government Borrowing
There are several good reasons that local governments borrow to
finance infrastructure. First, major capital projects such as airport terminals
or schools will last many years, and debt can be used to spread the cost of
such a project over its useful life. Spreading the burden of paying for a facility
fairly over time (referred to as “intergenerational equity” or “interperiod
equity”) is one of the justifications for borrowing to finance capital projects
rather than requiring current taxpayers or fee payers to pay the full cost of a
facility that will be used for many years. 50
In addition, because major capital projects arise only intermittently, it
would be difficult to finance them from revenue streams that do not vary
significantly from year to year. 51 A local government may borrow because it
not have sufficient funds to construct an urgently needed facility or because

See CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § i.4.1.1 (describing the types
of services provided by municipal advisors); Governing Inst., Bond Issuance Guide for Small
& Mid-sized Municipalities 13 (2017) (indicating that nationwide 85% of municipal bond
transactions had used a municipal advisor so far in 2017); Diana Yang, Top Municipal
Financing Team Participants: Calendar Year 2018, CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N,
DEBT LINE, Feb. 2019, at 3, 4-5 (indicating that municipal advisors were used on
approximately 53% of reported municipal debt issuances in California in 2018, down from
61% the prior year).
49
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(c)(1) (West 2020); MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-42(a)(ii),
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-42.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9SKB-U3PN] (last accessed Mar. 19, 2022).
50
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 9-10 (1961); CAL. DEBT & INV.
ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § i.2.2; LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, GUIDE TO BORROWING
AND BOND FOR OREGON MUNICIPALITIES 6 (2018); MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 37, at 133;
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 693–94 (4th ed. 1984); M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial
Integrity Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York
City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers’ Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 550–51
(1979).
51
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 9.
48
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its existing resources are required to meet other immediate needs. 52 Local
governments also borrow when the cost of borrowing is less than the expected
increase in construction or acquisition costs if the project is delayed until
funds are available. 53 New facilities may also attract new residents to the
community, increasing local governments’ ability to pay debt service. 54
Furthermore, some local governments borrow because this is the only
way that they can generate additional tax revenues to pay for a project. 55 That
is, they would not be allowed to impose or raise a tax or fee absent the
borrowing. For example, property taxes in California are limited by a cap
which can be exceeded for assessments to pay bonded debt approved by the
voters.56
However, there are also reasons that local governments may borrow
too much, or may borrow unwisely. Some of these reasons are discussed
infra, in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
3.2. State Regulation
Local governments are created by state law, and have only the powers
given to them by the state. 57 Local governments only have the powers
expressly conferred upon them by state constitution or statute or charter;
powers fairly implied by the powers expressly granted; and powers essential
to the declared objectives or purposes of the local government. 58 This is
referred to as “Dillon’s Rule.”59

52

LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, DEBT ISSUANCE MANUAL 1 (2007); see also CAL. DEBT & INV.
ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § i.2.2, i.2.2.2.
53
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § i.2.2.2; LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES,
supra note 50, at 6.
54
Tracy Nichols Eddy, The Referendum Requirement: A Constitutional Limitation on Local
Government Debt in Florida, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 677, 679 (1984).
55
LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, supra note 52, at 1.
56
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1 (b).
57
GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN
INNOVATION 2 (2008); Coniglio, supra note 5, at § 1.3; 2A MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 10.10
(3d ed., Aug. 2020 update). Some states allow cities to become subject to “home rule” and
have more control over their form of governance and local affairs. However, this power is
not unlimited. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 2.2.2 (describing some limitations
that remain under home rule); 2 MCQUILLIN at § 4.28 (describing home rule and some of its
limitations). Some of the laws discussed in this article do not apply to home rule cities.
58
2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 57, at § 10.10. See also CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N,
supra note 22, at § 1.1 (describing the application of this rule in California).
59
2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 57, at § 10.10.
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Borrowing by local governments is regulated by state constitutions
and statutes.60 The extent to which states exercise control over local
government borrowing varies. At one end of the spectrum is a requirement
that a state agency approve all local government bond issuances, or a
prohibition of all local government borrowing. North Carolina takes the
former approach for virtually all local government debt.61 At the other end of
the spectrum would be an unfettered ability to borrow on any terms the local
government deems appropriate. I am not aware of any state at this end of the
spectrum, though some are closer than others.
This article addresses four main categories of State bond laws:
restrictions on the ability to issue debt; limitations on the use of proceeds of
bonds; constraints on use of proceeds, terms of debt, and mechanics of selling
debt; and requirements for information to be made available and
opportunities for citizens to provide input. These categories of regulations are
discussed in Parts 5-7.
Some state laws include provisions governing how different types of
bonds are to be paid and secured, the remedies available to bondholders, and
provisions intended to ensure that bonds are not invalidated after they are
issued.62 State laws also address more general topics that are relevant to
municipal bonds, such as the treatment of financially distressed
municipalities and whether they can apply for bankruptcy, 63 restrictions on
the ability to raise taxes or other revenues, laws governing the duties of
government officials, laws concerning the procedures for elections, and open
meeting laws. While all of these laws are important, they are beyond the
scope of this article.

60

Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Chapter 12: State Laws Regarding Issuance of Bonds and Notes in
2 GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING § 12.1 (2d ed.) (database
updated Nov. 2020).
61
Adam C. Parker, Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State Oversight of Local-Government
Debt and the North Carolina Model, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107, 145 (2015).
62
See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at §§ 2.7, 5.2.1, 5.4, 5.14 (2d ed., 2020-2 Cum.
Sup.) for a description of some of the methods that states use to ensure the validity of bonds,
and a discussion of some provisions relating to payment of bonds and security and remedies
available to bondholders.
63
While Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Act governs municipal bankruptcy, it does so
only if state law permits the affected municipality to file for bankruptcy protection. See
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 5.15.2.2 and NAT’L ASSOC. OF BOND LAWYERS,
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC FINANCE ATTORNEYS 40–43 (2011) for
discussion of this limitation and some of the relevant state laws.
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3.3. Reasons for States to Regulate Local Government Borrowing
The consequences of borrowing too much or borrowing unwisely can
be severe. Local governments in financial distress may have to cut important
city services, may default on bonds, and may (in some states) file for
bankruptcy protection. There were 55 defaults on municipal bonds rated by
Moody’s Investors Service (one of the three main organizations that provides
credit ratings on municipal bonds) between 2007 and 2019, including defaults
by 24 general governments (such as counties, municipalities, and
townships).64 Financial distress and defaults harm not only bondholders, but
also residents and potentially the state and other communities in the state.
When issuers experience financial distress, bondholders may not be paid the
full amount they are owed, or payments to them may be delayed. Residents
and property owners may experience reduced services or increased taxes and
fees.65 Retired employees may lose their retirement benefits. 66 States may be
under pressure to provide fiscal relief to the distressed city, and other cities
in the state may have to pay higher interest rates on their bonds.67
While local government financial distress has causes other than
imprudent borrowing, obligations to pay large amounts of debt service can
certainly contribute to financial problems. For example, the use of auction
rate securities (on which interest rates were reset periodically at auction, or if
the auction failed, were set at predetermined rates, which often ranged
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., US MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS AND RECOVERIES 19702019 7 (2020).
65
For example, during its bankruptcy, the City of Vallejo made significant cuts to police and
firefighting services, resulting in more violent crime and longer response times to fires and
medical emergencies. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS 14 (2013). See also Christine Sgarlata Chung,
Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal Competition for State and Local
Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt, Pension and OBEP Obligations,
and Taxpayer Needs, REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 667 (2013) (describing some impacts of
the Detroit’s fiscal distress on taxpayers and noting that they “face escalating expenses,
crumbling infrastructure, and grossly inadequate services, despite their tax burden”). Note,
however, that some local governments have strongly resisted doing either of these things.
See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 285 (2012) (describing “refusals of fiscally distressed
municipalities to accept higher taxes or reduced services”).
66
For example, in its bankruptcy proceedings the City of Detroit, Michigan cut pension and
health care benefits for retirees. Christine Ferretti, For Detroit Retirees, Pension Cuts
Become Reality, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/
news/local/wayne-county/2015/02/27/detroit-retirees-pension-cuts-become-reality/
24156301/ [https://perma.cc/V4LD-KUZA].
67
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 37–38; Gillette,
supra note 65, at 288, 303–09 (2012); Parker, supra note 61, at 112 (quoting Massachusetts
Representative Barney Frank).
64
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between 12-15% and as high as 20%) 68 and interest rates swaps appear to
have contributed to fiscal challenges that local governments confronted
during and in the aftermath of the 2008 economic downturn.69
Even absent financial distress, borrowing may result in excessive
costs for local governments and may reduce government flexibility to address
changing circumstances. Payments on debt can divert funds from other
important uses. Furthermore, in addition to the obligation to make the
payments, debt can come with burdensome financial and operating
covenants, and failure to comply with covenants may result in a default.70
Debt gives some power over policy decisions to lenders, rating agencies and
others.71 For all of these reasons, state governments are justified in regulating
local government borrowing.
Two primary reasons (in addition to the need under Dillon’s Rule to
provide clear authorization for local governments to be allowed to borrow at
all) that states regulate local government borrowing are discussed in the
following subsections: incentives of local governments to borrow more than
they should, or for longer than they should; and inexperience or lack of
knowledge leading local government officials to make unwise decisions
about borrowing.
3.3.1. Incentives to Borrow Too Much
Government officials may have incentives to borrow more (and for
longer) than would be consistent with interperiod equity, 72 and possibly than
the local government can comfortably support, in order to obtain short-term

68

See Lori Raineri & Darien Shanske, Municipal Finance and Asymmetric Risk, 4 BELMONT
L. REV. 65, 72–73 (2017) (describing auction rate securities); Christine Sgarlata Chung,
Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic
Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1488
(2013) (noting that interest rates on auction rate securities could be as high as 20% when
auctions failed).
69
Spencer T. Bachus, Federal Policy Responses to the Predicament of Municipal Finance,
40 CUMB. L. REV. 759, 765–67 (2010); Chung, supra note 68, at 1487–91; Theresa A.
Gabaldon, The Sewers of Jefferson County: Disclosure, Trust and Truth in Modern Finance,
in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM, 255, 256–
59 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010); Raineri & Shanske, supra
note 68, at 66; Tom Sgouros, Predatory Public Finance, 17 J. L. SOC’Y 91, 91–93 (2015).
70
See infra notes 181–82 & 261 and accompanying text for discussion of some covenants.
71
See Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L. J. 860, 864–65 (2012)
(citing David Hume and noting that debt gives capital markets some power to dictate policy
choices). See also generally Roger Biles, Public Policy Made by Private Enterprise: Bond
Rating Agencies and Urban America, 44 J. URB. HIST. 1098 (2018) (describing the influence
that credit rating agencies have on public policy).
72
See text accompanying note 50 for discussion of interperiod equity.
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benefits the cost of which will not be paid until far into the future. 73
Furthermore, special interest groups that benefit from a particular borrowing
may influence officials to undertake the transaction, resulting in more debt
than is appropriate or debt the cost of which outweighs the benefits for the
population as a whole.74
Voters may not prevent officials from borrowing too much. Elected
officials may rely on support from interest groups to help them be elected or
reelected, and these groups may not have the same interests as the broader
community.75 Even if current constituents are concerned about the burden on
future residents, that will be merely one of many factors that contribute to
their decision of whether to re-elect the local official. 76 In addition, voters
may not monitor local government finances adequately. Even assuming that
residents generally prefer that their local government behave in a fiscally
responsible manner, each individual resident has the incentive to rely on
others to monitor, with the result being an underinvestment in monitoring,
and those that do have a greater interest in monitoring may not represent the
interests of the residents as a whole. 77
Furthermore, voters may have similar incentives to government
officials to benefit today even if doing so burdens future residents, or they
may not fully appreciate the long-term impacts of borrowing.78
See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.1.1 (“[L]ocal officials, who will want to
demonstrate constructive activity to constituents before the next election, have incentives to
over-utilize debt, paying scant attention to long-term adverse effects.”); Richard Briffault,
Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 917–18 (2003) (“the ability to shift the costs forward may … induce
elected officials to incur too much debt” because “they can get the credit for the new project
immediately, while the blame for the additional taxes needed to pay off the debt will be borne
by their successors”); Gelfand, supra note 50, at 549–51 (noting that future taxpayers are the
primary beneficiaries of debt ceilings); Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman,
Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt
Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1323–24 (1991) (“Debt limitations were meant to cure
a perceived institutional defect of legislatures: the inability to account for the future costs of
present decisions to incur debt.”)
74
See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 73, at 1365–66.
75
Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937,
955 (2008).
76
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.1.1.
77
Gillette, supra note 75, at 955, 961–64. Gillette identifies expected duration of residency
and different individual priorities within the range of services provided by local governments
as two reasons that even if some residents monitor, they may not represent residents as a
whole. Id. at 961-964.
78
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at §§ 2.1, 4.1.1; Gelfand, supra note 50, at 599 (also
noting that voters may reject desirable projects); Shoked, supra note 31, at 1267. If debt
service were fully capitalized into real estate values and rents—that is, if property values
fully reflected the cost of future debt service—then the interests of current and future
73
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3.3.2. Lack of Expertise
Local government officials are not always experienced or
knowledgeable enough to make good decisions about borrowing. Only 38%
of government leaders surveyed considered themselves experts or very
knowledgeable about public finance. 79 Local governments often have few
resources dedicated to debt management, and frequently borrowing is outside
the primary roles of even those officials responsible for issuing debt.80 Many
local governments only issue bonds once every few years; staff and officials
at these governments may be particularly likely to be unfamiliar with the
bond issuance process. Smaller communities tend to have smaller financial
staffs, and the differences in capacity are likely to impact management of the

residents would be more closely aligned. Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt,
13 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 365, 392 (2004). Scholars have reached varying conclusions
about the extent to which taxes are capitalized into home values, though it appears that some
capitalization occurs. See id. at 392 (noting varying conclusions about the extent of
capitalization but indicating that some level of capitalization occurs); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOMES VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE AND LAND USE POLICIES 47–51 (2005) (discussing various
capitalization studies and concluding that anticipated taxes are fully capitalized). However,
even if property taxes are fully capitalized in some circumstances, it seems unlikely that the
possibility of higher taxes in the future to pay debt service, much less the possibility of higher
rates, charges or fees of other kinds, would be.
79
Justin Marlowe, Guide to Financial Literacy: Connecting Money, Policy and Priorities,
GOVERNING 5 (2014), https://media.erepublic.com/document/GOV14_FinancialLiteracy_v.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7V4A-NQ9G]. See also Thomas A. Schweich, Missouri State Auditor,
Report No. 2013-116, Statewide General Obligation Bond Sales Practices 12 (2013) (“Based
on interviews with local government finance officials, there is a clear lack of understanding
of the bond issuance process.”).
80
GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASSOC., DEBT 101: ISSUING BONDS AND YOUR CONTINUING
OBLIGATIONS 2 (2020); Monique Moyer, Current Issues Facing Bond Issuers and Their
Financial Advisors, MUN. FIN. J. 17, 18 (2003); see also ANG & GREEN, supra note 19, at 8
(“Furthermore, when municipalities negotiate with investment banks and other financial
intermediaries to issue debt, municipalities often have less expertise and relatively few
resources to guide their decision making. This is detrimental not only to investors, but also
to municipalities themselves.”); Jack Casey, MCDC’s Appropriateness, Effect on Market
Disclosure Debated, B OND B UYER (May 5, 2016), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/
washington-securities-law/mcdcs-appropriateness-effect-on-market-disclosure-debated1102961-1.html [https://perma.cc/KYZ8-F6R3] (noting that officials at small issuers
sometimes have multiple responsibilities and citing the example of a finance director for a
small school district who also drives the school bus).
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issuer’s debt, including the interest rates paid on that debt. 81 Even large
issuers don’t always understand the agreements they make. 82
Of course, there are also many local government officials who are
extremely capable and knowledgeable about local government finance and
borrowing. Some of the most knowledgeable, intelligent, dedicated people
with whom I have had the pleasure to work have been local government
officials involved in public finance. Some local government officials are
recognized leaders in their field, training others at programs for the
Government Finance Officers Association, the California Debt and
Investment Advisory Commission, and others.83
3.4. How Problems Have Developed
Many state laws governing municipal bonds have developed
piecemeal over the years, with new laws being added on top of existing
legislation, rather than legislation being revised in its entirety. 84 Furthermore,
in most states bond laws are scattered throughout numerous statutes and
codes.85 The requirements for different types of bonds and different types of
issuers are not always the same (and this is not always intentional). 86 This

81

Bill Simonsen et al., The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on Municipal Bond
Interest Rates: An Empirical Analysis, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 709, 710–11, 715 (2001).
82
See Stephan Whitaker, Financial Innovations and Issuer Sophistication in Municipal
Securities Markets 4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Clev., Working Paper No. 14-04, 2014) (citing
Orange County, California and Detroit, Michigan as examples).
83
See, e.g., Debt Management: Overview of a Bond Issuance, Gov’t Fin. Officers Assoc.,
https://www.gfoa.org/events/overview-of-a-bond-issuance [https://perma.cc/EKG6-3BV4];
Municipal Debt Issuance Fundamentals, Cal. Debt & Inv. Advisory Comm’n,
https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/webinars/2020/20200909/description.asp [https://
perma.cc/XZ8P-TLTA]; Navigating Investor Disclosures during the COVID-19 Crisis, Cal.
Debt & Inv. Advisory Comm’n, https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/webinars/2020/
20200501/description.asp [https://perma.cc/Y4ZB-HHHC].
84
Salsich, supra note 60, at §§ 12.1, 12.2; see also CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N,
supra note 22, at § 1.1.2 (noting that rather than amending existing statutes to reflect changes
in the bond market, California added a series of statutes that apply to all local governments
issuing bonds); Fredric A. Weber, et al., A Case for Public Finance Reform in Texas, 23
HOUS. L. REV. 1113, 1113–16 (1986) (describing Texas borrowing law as developing
“gradually by bits and pieces in response to immediate needs” and describing the tendency
to establish new governments and to add new statutes rather than amending existing ones).
85
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.1; see also CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra
note 22, at App. A (a list of bonding statutes that spans several pages).
86
Id. at § 12.2; see Harvey W. Rogers, Government Borrowings Work Group: Revision of
State and Local Government Borrowing Laws Found in ORS Chapters 286, 287 and 288 HB
3265, in BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE OR. LAW COMM’N 2005-2007 § 2 (noting that prior to a
revision of Oregon bond law in 2007, local governments were “occasionally left out because
of drafting inconsistencies”).
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makes it more difficult (and hence more time consuming and potentially more
costly) to determine which requirements apply to a particular transaction. 87
Additionally, state laws have not always kept up with changing
circumstances. For example, debt limits are tied to property values in most
states.88 This dates back to 1800s, when property taxes generated most local
government revenues and property owners were regarded as a class deserving
special protection. 89 Today, more local government revenues come from
sources other than property taxes, and several have suggested that, to the
extent debt limits should apply, this is not an appropriate measure. 90 Some
laws do not reflect current market practices. For example, Montana law
requires that a notice of competitive sale be published in a local newspaper,
and Hawaii law requires that a notice of a competitive sale be published in a
financial newspaper published in New York, Chicago or San Francisco. 91 As
a practical matter, bidders are more likely to learn of a competitive sale
through an online service today. Complying with or legally avoiding archaic
requirements can be costly.
Complicated laws increase the likelihood of errors. For example, one
New York bond lawyer has noted that in reviewing bond resolutions and
procedures taken by New York local governments, his firm “often find[s] an
error or other violation of New York State law that raises an issue of the
validity of the bond resolution.”92

87

See Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.2 (noting that authorizing statutes must be reviewed
carefully); Rogers, supra note 86, at § 2 (noting that “ambiguous or inconsistent” borrowing
statutes create “significant and unnecessary cost” to local governments and that prior to the
revisions in HB 3265, it had become increasingly difficult to determine how different
statutory provisions relate to each other and what the statutes mean).
88
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.2; M. David Gelfand, Chapter 11: Debt Ceilings
and Other Restrictions on Debt Financing: Compliance, Avoidance, and Evasion, in 1
GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING §§ 11.1, 11.4 (2d ed.)
(database updated Nov. 2020).
89
Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.1.
90
See infra Section 5.1.2.
91
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §47-8 (LexisNexis 2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-7-2252 (2019).
92
A. Joseph Scott, III, Ten Common Mistakes in the Preparation and Adoption of Bond
Resolutions, T ALK OF THE T OWNS 14, 14 (2009), https://www.hodgsonruss.com/media/
publication/47_AJS_ATSNY_10_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUU2-QGFQ]. Correcting
these errors can delay a financing. Id.
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4. MOVING TOWARDS A BETTER BOND LAW
4.1. This Is Not a New Idea
Parts 5-7 of this article discuss some existing bond law provisions and
recommended improvements. This is not the first time that improved bond
laws have been proposed. The National Municipal League proposed a model
county and municipal bond law in 1953, a model municipal revenue bond law
in 1958 and a revised model municipal bond law in 1962.93 Individual states
have taken actions to improve their bond laws. For example, Texas
consolidated (but did not revise) its bond laws in 1999.94 Oregon reformed
its bond law in 2007 with the objectives of clarifying how provisions relate
to each other; simplifying and modernizing language and definitions;
eliminating inconsistencies and outdated or unnecessary requirements;
making financing techniques available to all local governments unless there
was a reason not to do so; granting the state Treasurer more authority to adopt
rules affecting borrowings; and reforming older statutes to allow local
governments to adapt to evolving market conditions. 95 The revisions did not
affect debt limits or other requirements that are in the state’s constitution.
In addition, others have criticized and proposed alternatives to some
aspects of municipal bond law, particularly debt limits and voter approval
requirements. Some of these criticisms and alternatives are discussed
elsewhere in this article.

See generally, NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, A MODEL COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL BOND LAW
(1953); NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL MUNICIPAL REVENUE BOND LAW (1958); NAT’L
MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL MUNICIPAL BOND LAW (1962).
94
See generally 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 227 (H.B. 3157) (VERNON'S); see also Tex.
Office of House Bill Analysis, Bill Analysis, H.B. 3157 (July 15, 1999) (“The Public
Securities title is a nonsubstantive revision of Texas law. The sole purpose of the title is to
compile the relevant law, arrange it in logical fashion, and rewrite it without altering its
meaning or legal effect. If a particular source statute is ambiguous and the ambiguity cannot
be resolved without a potential substantive effect, the ambiguity is preserved.”),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/76R/analysis/html/HB03157I.htm [https://perma.cc/X4ZG5ZSA].
95
Rogers, supra note 86, at § 3. This bill “was warmly received by both Oregon House and
Senate Revenue Committees, sailed through both chambers and was signed into law by the
governor.” David R. Kenagy, The Oregon Law Commission at Ten: Finding Vision for the
Future in the Functions of the Past, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 169, 190 n. 78 (2007). Although
some policy changes were made by this bill, making policy changes was not its objective.
Rogers, supra note 86, at § 4.
93
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4.2. Starting a Conversation
This article is intended to start a conversation about changes that
could be made to move towards better bond laws. It does not present a single
model bond law for all states, or for a particular state, nor does it describe in
detail the complete bond laws of any particular state or the specific types of
bonds that may be issued in any particular state. Rather, it is intended to
provide decisionmakers with a basis for making informed decisions about the
approach to municipal bonds that is most appropriate for local governments
in their state. States vary in the types and structures of local governments and
the powers given to them. 96 Values and priorities are also likely to vary
among states, so different states may prefer different solutions.
Furthermore, it does not address all aspects of bond laws. Instead, it
focuses on areas that affect the ability of local governments to make decisions
about how much debt to issue, in what form, with what terms, and how to sell
that debt and the ability of the public to be aware of and to impact those
decisions. Within this scope, the article provides a recommended policy
option (or options) and the reasoning for the recommendations, as well as
other alternatives and some examples of what states currently do. It addresses
both constitutional and statutory provisions (recognizing that constitutional
ones may be difficult to change).
4.3. Underlying Goals
Ideally, law governing local borrowing would achieve two principal
goals: (1) providing local governments the freedom to innovate and make
decisions in the interest of their citizens while protecting current and future
citizens from poor decisions made by local governments, 97 and (2) ensuring

See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., A-127, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY: NEEDS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
JUDICIAL CLARIFICATION 7 (1993) (noting that local governments take a variety of forms and
organizational structures); FRUG & BARRON, supra note 57, at Part II (comparing the powers
given to seven major cities in the United States).
97
Or, to put it another way, “striking a careful balance between flexibility in the exercise of
authority on the one hand, and appropriate controls and safeguards on the other.” Elsie Addo
Awadzi, Designing Legal Frameworks for Public Debt Management 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund
Working Paper no. WP/15/147, 2015). Also see ADVISORY C OMM’N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 2 (the purpose of bond laws is “[t]o empower
local governments to make use of borrowing, prudently and in a responsible and locally
responsive manner, as one means for financing their requirements.”).
96
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that information is available to the public and that the public has a meaningful
opportunity to influence proposed local government borrowing.98
4.3.1. Freedom and Protection
This article starts with the premise that there is value in allowing local
governments to make their own decisions, in large part because local
governments are more likely to represent the interests of their citizens than
the state or federal government is.99 This is not to say that there should be no
restrictions on local government action. For example, local governments
should not be able to impose negative externalities on other communities or
on future citizens (such as by violating interperiod equity), nor should they
be able to act in ways that are fundamentally inconsistent with important
values like protecting civil rights and promoting racial equality.
However, current and future citizens deserve and need protection
from poor decisions made by local governments. As was discussed in
Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, local government officials may be predisposed to
98

Others have also noted the importance of transparency and responsiveness. See, e.g.,
Awadzi, supra note 97, at 4 (noting the importance of transparency and accountability, along
with discipline); Gelfand, supra note 50, at 579, 586 (noting the importance of providing
accurate information to stakeholders, including officials and voters, and of government being
responsive to citizens).
99
Various commentators have taken this view. See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22,
at § 1.1.3 (noting that local governments have been viewed as “the focal point of attempts to
formulate communities of like-minded individuals” and “the only meaningful places in
which political participation can occur and the objectives of democracy be realized” and that
these perspectives suggest that local governments should differ from each other in the goods
and services they provide); FRUG & BARRON, supra note 57, at 49–52 (highlighting the
importance of local governments to democracy and innovation); Heather K.
Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEM. J. 37 (2012), https://democracyjournal.
org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/MA4W-MC5K] (noting
that racial and political minorities can have more power at the local level than at the federal
or state level); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 418 (1956) (suggesting that people will move to the community that best meets their set
of preferences and that more communities and more variation between them will allow more
people to more closely meet their preferences). Some have noted increased efforts of states
to restrict power of local governments (in areas other than debt issuance) in recent years. See,
e.g., Jessica Amoroso & Sarah Winston, COVID-19 Unmasks Issues Around Public Health
Preemption, HARV. L. SCH. PETRIE-FLOM CTR,: BILL OF HEALTH (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/21/covid-public-health-preemption/
[https://perma.cc/R2AH-9P9M] (noting that state preemption is increasingly being used to
prevent local governments from addressing public health issues, such as paid sick leave or
prohibiting stay-at-home measures or mask requirements to prevent the spread of COVID19); Erin Scharff, Preemption and Fiscal Authority, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1270, 1273–74,
1279–82 (2018) (describing more restrictive state laws constraining local governments and
citing examples); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV.
1163, 1169–83 (2018) (citing examples).
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borrow more than they should and some officials may not be sufficiently
knowledgeable to make prudent decisions about borrowing. This article
suggests that while some restrictions on borrowing are appropriate, for the
most part education and support is a better solution to lack of expertise than
are detailed rules about the terms of financings. More straightforward bond
laws may even help local government officials make better borrowing
decisions, as is discussed in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2. Ensuring Public Opportunity to Participate
The second primary objective of the framework is ensuring that
information is available to the public and that the public has a meaningful
opportunity to provide input on proposed local government borrowing. It is
critical in a democratic society that residents are aware of and have the
opportunity to understand the significant actions that are being taken by their
government (including their local government) and that they have the
opportunity to influence those actions, whether that is through public
comment, contacting public officials, or voting on the matter.
4.3.3. Other Key Principles
In addition to the underlying goals identified above, the framework is
guided by several principles. In particular, the importance of:
• Treating all local governments the same except where
there is a reason not to do so.
• Treating all debt the same except where there is a
reason not to do so.
• Focusing on the economics of the transaction rather
than the structure.
• Providing flexibility for changing circumstances and
market conditions.
• Avoiding overlapping, inconsistent and unduly
complicated provisions whenever possible, and keep
related provisions together whenever possible.
Each of these principles contributes to the underlying goals described
above. Consistent treatment of different types of government and different
types of debt encourage local governments to make decisions based on which
type of financing structure best meets their needs rather than based on
restrictions or approval requirements that apply to some types of debt but not
others. Treating types of government and borrowings consistently also will
promote transparency.100 Similarly, laws that focus on the economics of the
100

See infra note 180 and accompanying text.

340

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[May 2022

transaction rather than its structure are less likely to distort borrowing
decisions, and flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and market
conditions is more likely to allow local governments to structure their
borrowing optimally and to avoid needing to satisfy obsolete requirements.
Structuring borrowing law as simply as possible should make the law easier
for both the governments and citizens to understand and follow and should
help local governments avoid making costly mistakes.
4.4. Limitations of the Framework
Due to constraints of space, the framework doesn’t cover all possible
types of borrowing or financing, nor does it specifically address interest rate
swaps or other derivatives in any detail. Instead, it focuses on general
obligation bonds and revenue bonds issued by local governments. Some of
the same principles could be applied to other types of financing. The article
uses the term “borrowing” to cover all transactions that result in a local
government receiving money in exchange for an obligation to repay, but does
not cover other obligations local governments may have, such as
commitments to pay pension and other benefits to retirees in the future.
Furthermore, the article is focused on general purpose local
governments and special districts, not on bonds issued for the benefit of
private nonprofit or for-profit entities. Borrowings on behalf of private parties
raise some of the same concerns, but many different ones.
Additionally, as noted in Section 4.2 above, this article focuses on
topics related to the scope of decision-making authority of local governments
and the involvement of community members in the decision-making process,
rather than more technical (but also important) aspects of bonds such as how
revenues to pay bonds are collected, how bonds are secured, remedies
available to bondholders and methods to ensure the validity of bonds issued.
Those topics, and perhaps a proposed uniform act that could be adopted by
multiple states covering some or all of them, could be the subject of a separate
article or a project by an organization such as the National Association of
Bond Lawyers.
State laws also address topics that are relevant to municipal bonds but
have more general applicability, such as laws concerning treatment of
financially distressed municipalities and whether they can apply for
bankruptcy, restrictions on the ability to raise taxes or other revenues, laws
governing the duties of government officials, laws concerning the procedures
for elections, and open meeting laws. While these laws are all important, they
are beyond the scope of this article.
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5. RESTRICTIONS ON THE ABILITY TO ISSUE DEBT: DEBT LIMITS AND
VOTER APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS
5.1. Debt Limits
5.1.1. Existing Debt Limits
Most states impose limits on the amount of debt issued by their local
governments.101 Some of these limits appear in state constitutions and others
are statutory. The limits take a variety of forms, most commonly a fixed
percentage of property values.102 The limits imposed on governments vary,
sometimes even for different local governments within a state or for debt
issued for different purposes. For example, the Hawaii Constitution limits
outstanding debt of a local government to 15% of the total assessed value of
real property within the local government’s boundaries.103 The New York
Constitution includes a range of limits based on a percentage of average full
valuation, including, among others, 10% for Nassau County and 7% for other
counties; 10% for New York City, 9% for other cities with populations of
125,000 or more and 7% for smaller cities; 7% for towns and villages. 104
Oregon limits outstanding general obligation bonds of counties to 2% of the
market value of taxable property in the county, and of cities to 3% of the
market value of the taxable property in the city (with exceptions for cities for
some types of projects). 105 California limits the outstanding general
obligation bonds of elementary and high school districts to 1.25% of the
assessed value of taxable property in the district, while the limit for nonhome-rule cities is 3.75% and for counties is 1.25% or 3.75% depending on
the purpose for which the bonds are being issued.106
101

Spiotto, supra note 4, at 6–8 (discussing the limits states have placed on debt
municipalities may issue and noting that all states except three have a limit on local
government debt); Gillette, supra note 4, at 1255 (“Virtually every state constitution imposes
limits on the amount of debt that its political subdivisions can issue in order to fund capital
projects . . .”).
102
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
103
HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 13. The Hawaii Constitution includes exceptions to this limit.
Assessed value is the value assigned to property by a taxing authority for purposes of ad
valorem taxation. The method of establishing assessed valuation varies from state to state
and is sometimes lower than the market value of the property. Glossary of Municipal
Securities Terms: Average Life, M UN . SEC . R ULEMAKING B D., http://www.msrb.org/
Glossary/Definition/ASSESSED-VALUATION-OR-ASSESSED-VALUE.aspx [https://
perma.cc/6PCS-45EN].
104
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
105
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 287A.050, 287A.100 (2019).
106
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC NO. 06-04, CALIFORNIA DEBT ISSUANCE
PRIMER 138 (2006). The limit for unified school districts (which include both elementary
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Exceptions to debt limits sometimes make them less meaningful. For
example, local governments in New York are rarely constrained by debt
limits because of exclusions and deductions.107 Some state laws, such as the
California and Oregon laws described in the preceding paragraph, expressly
apply limits only to certain types of debt, and courts also have created
exceptions to these limitations in most states.108 This is discussed in greater
detail in Section 5.3.

and high schools) is 2.5%. Id. The California State Board of Education sometimes waives
the limits for school districts. KEVIN DAYTON, CAL. POLICY CTR., FOR THE KIDS:
CALIFORNIA VOTERS MUST BECOME WARY OF BORROWING BILLIONS MORE FROM
WEALTHY INVESTORS FOR EDUCATIONAL CONSTRUCTION 44 (2015).
107
See DOUGLAS E. GOODFRIEND & THOMAS E. MYERS, ORRICK, BOND BASICS FOR SCHOOL
DISTRICTS IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2009), https://media.orrick.com/Media%20Library/
public/files/2/2163-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKK5-2VCS] [hereinafter GOODFRIEND &
MYERS, BOND BASICS FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS] (noting this with respect to school districts
other than small city school districts); DOUGLAS E. GOODFRIEND & THOMAS E. MYERS,
ORRICK, BOND BASICS FOR TOWNS, VILLAGES AND CITIES IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2009),
https://media.orrick.com/Media%20Library/public/files/2/2161-pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BSH2-JWU9] [hereinafter GOODFRIEND & MYERS, BOND BASICS FOR
TOWNS, VILLAGES AND CITIES] (noting this with respect to towns, villages and cities);
THOMAS E. MYERS & DOUGLAS E. GOODFRIEND, ORRICK, BOND BASICS FOR COUNTIES IN
NEW YORK STATE 5 (2009), https://media.orrick.com/Media%20Library/public/files/2/
2160-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM9J-TFNW] [hereinafter MYERS & GOODFRIEND, BOND
BASICS FOR COUNTIES] (noting this with respect to counties); THOMAS E. MYERS &
DOUGLAS E. GOODFRIEND, ORRICK, BOND BASICS FOR FIRE DISTRICTS IN NEW YORK STATE
5 (2010), https://media.orrick.com/Media%20Library/public/files/4/4257 -pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3VA-BQS3] [hereinafter MYERS & GOODFRIEND, BOND BASICS FOR
FIRE DISTRICTS] (noting this with respect to fire districts).
108
See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.1.1 (“[M]yriad devices have evolved,
largely with judicial blessing, to remove borrowing schemes from what might, in common
parlance, be considered debt.”); Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.12 (indicating that most
courts have held that debt not backed by the government’s full faith and credit is exempt
from debt ceilings and referenda requirements); Shoked, supra note 31, at 1253–54 (noting
that financing structures that are equivalent to debt are not always subject to limits and that
debt limits typically only apply to debt guaranteed by property taxes).
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5.1.2. Debt Limits in Their Current Form Do More Harm Than Good
and Should Be Replaced or, Better Yet, Eliminated, Wherever
Possible
Effective debt limits would promote interperiod equity and prevent
local governments from borrowing more than they can afford.109 However, it
is unlikely that debt limits in their current form achieve these goals, even if
they are effective. Furthermore, debt limits may have negative impacts on
some communities and prevent needed projects from proceeding, and they
may be counter to the objective of providing the public with a meaningful
opportunity to influence borrowing (at least if such borrowing exceeds the
legal limits, since it would not be permitted regardless of public sentiment).
If debt limits are effective, they raise some of the issues discussed below. The
possibility that they may not be effective and may simply lead to more
expensive debt and less transparency is discussed in Section 5.3. For these
reasons, discussed in greater detail below, debt limits should be modified or,
better yet, eliminated.
As was noted above, debt limits vary widely. Although some
differences in limits may be explained by the different responsibilities or
needs of local governments in different states, or of different types of local
governments in the same state, 110 the wide variety of limits “. . . suggests that,
far from being linked to some conception of an optimal amount of debt, these
provisions have been created in a haphazard manner in order to place some
cap on borrowing, regardless of how that level correlates to ability to pay, to
need, or to any other standard.” 111 Compounding the problem, a single
property may be within the boundaries of multiple overlapping local
governments (for example, county, city, school district, special districts) with
separate debt limitations, meaning that the amount of debt burdening that

109

See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 2.1 (describing the purposes of
restrictions as ensuring that bonds are issued only when the societal benefits outweigh the
costs and describing interperiod equity as the purpose of debt limits); Gelfand, supra note
88, at § 11.2 (describing effective debt ceilings as protecting future taxpayers from
“inordinate debt service on capital projects that may have produced few tangible benefits for
them”); see also supra Section 3.3.
110
See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 44 (suggesting
that different types of local governments should have different limits because of differences
in “scope of responsibilities and financial needs” and noting that municipal governments
commonly borrow several times more than counties, school districts or townships).
111
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.2. See also Gillette, supra note 4, at 1258 (noting
that “the variety of limitations placed on municipalities belies [the] proposition” that
“municipal debt limitations reflect[] some sophisticated analysis of the optimal debt level
that a locality should incur” and describing various limits).
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property may be far higher than the debt limit for any individual local
government within the boundaries of which it is located. 112
Furthermore, even if an optimal level of borrowing had been
determined, it is not likely that level would be tied to real property values,
particularly with respect to debt that is not payable exclusively from property
taxes. When debt limits were initially enacted over a century ago, local
revenues were derived almost entirely from property taxes.113 Today, though,
property taxes comprise a minority of overall local government revenues
(45.3% of local own-source revenues and 28.3% of total local government
general revenues in 2008).114
Property taxes tend to be a relatively stable revenue source because
they are based on asset value rather than an annual stream of income or
sales.115 In some states, property tax revenues can be adjusted when property
values decline by increasing tax rates.116 For these reasons, if there are limits
on borrowing, they should be a component of the limit. However, it would be
sensible to also include other sources that would be available to pay debt
service, including revenues from other taxes and fees. A limit based on
appropriations or revenues (or revenues available to pay debt service) would
be a better gauge of ability to pay. 117 This would not, however, address the
112

See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.13 (discussing this problem); see also supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
113
Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.1.
114
Michael E. Bell, Real Property Tax, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCE 271, 271 (Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2012). Local ownsource revenues are revenues generated by the local government itself (such as taxes and
fees) rather than received from the federal or state government. General revenues are
revenues that can be used for any purpose. A property tax that must be used to pay debt
service on bonds or a grant that must be used for a specific purpose would not be general
revenues. The extent to which local governments depend on property taxes varies. For
example, on average, property taxes are responsible for 14% of California city revenues,
22% of California county revenues, and 65% of non-enterprise special district (such as fire
district or library district) revenues. INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, Understanding the Basics of
Municipal Revenues in California: Cities, Counties and Special District (2016 Update),
https://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/basics_of_municipal_revenue_
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV6X-ZXCH], 4–6.
115
Bell, supra note 114, at 274–75.
116
See Catherine Collins and Geoffrey Propheter, Tax Analysts Special Report: The Property
Tax Base and The Great Recession, TAX ANALYSTS, at 445 (2013) (noting that some locales
did this during the 2007–2009 recession). The ability to raise tax rates is limited in some
states. For example, the California Constitution imposes a 1% limit on property taxes with
some exceptions, most significantly for voter-approved bonds. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1.
117
See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.2 (suggesting that limits based on revenues
or appropriations might be better); Briffault, supra note 73, at 948 (noting that debt
limitations might be more defensible if they were tied to the revenue-generating capacity of
governments); Gelfand, supra note 50, at 587 (noting that limiting debt based on only a
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issue of what the limit should be and as noted above, there does not seem to
be consensus on what an appropriate limit is.
Debt limits tied to property values also may exacerbate existing
economic disparities. Jurisdictions with relatively low property values per
capita are more likely to be constrained by debt limits, both because the limits
restrict them to a smaller amount per capita to meet infrastructure needs and
because areas with lower property values may have greater needs than areas
with higher property values.118
Debt limits of the type discussed in this section do little to promote
interperiod equity since they say nothing about how debt is amortized, the
period for which debt is outstanding or the amount that can be borrowed for
a particular project, all they restrict is the total amount borrowed. If set too
low, debt limits could even be counter to interperiod equity because they
would not allow for enough borrowing. That said, some studies do suggest
that communities that are subject to debt limits borrow less than those not
subject to such limits.119
In addition, debt limits can block desirable as well as undesirable
debt.120 Because of the important role that debt plays in providing important
infrastructure, “[l]ow levels of debt and the resulting low levels of capital
portion of the government’s income base is not effective and proposing including wealth if
there is an income tax and sales volume if there is a sales tax).
118
See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.15 (noting there may be an inverse
relationship between assessed valuation and need and debt limits may prevent the localities
most in need of debt financing from borrowing); ORANGE CNTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL
B ONDS —T HE UNTOLD STORY OF ASSESSED VALUES
11–12
(2014),
https://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2013_2014_GJreport/BondsReport.pdf [https://perma.
cc/G6VH-4KRP] (providing an example of how borrowing capacity in a school district with
lower assessed value per student compares to that in a district with higher assessed value per
student); Eric J. Brunner & Kim Rueben, Financing New School Construction and
Modernization: Evidence from California, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 527, 535–36 (2001) (school
districts that have low assessed valuation per student are more likely to be constrained by
debt limits that are based on property values); Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging:
Local Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of (and Solution to) the Current Housing Crisis,
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 703 n. 110 (2010) (noting that a limit on the tax rate required
for debt service compared to assessed value has a disproportionate impact on areas with
lower property values). The same may also be true of debt limits tied to local government
revenues generally, and grants or other mechanisms to redistribute resources may be more
effective at reducing disparities than relaxing restrictions on borrowing, though this topic is
beyond the scope of this article).
119
See infra note 178. Of course, it may be that regions where residents are less supportive
of government borrowing are more likely to have debt limits. Others also have made this
point. See D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing:
An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 69 (1996) (noting that
debt limits may “reflect the degree to which citizens of the state are averse to borrowing”).
120
See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 73, at 1366 (“Mechanical limitations are doomed to
failure,” in part because they can prevent borrowing even when it is desirable).
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investment can be as harmful to a state or locality as excessive debt,” but debt
limits that do not take need into account do nothing to address this. 121 In
addition, debt limits that cannot be modified by approval of voters in the
affected area negatively affect the ability to respond to community desires
because even if voters within a local government’s boundary want to borrow
in excess of the limit, they cannot do so unless the state legislature and/or
voters statewide act to allow them to do so.122
Some of these issues may have contributed to the creation of
exceptions to debt limits described in Section 5.3. These exceptions have
created significant additional problems. Because similar issues arise
regarding exceptions to voter authorization requirements, both are discussed
together in Section 5.3.
5.2. Voter Approval Requirements
5.2.1. Existing Voter Approval Requirements
Most states have voter approval requirements for some local
government borrowing, most commonly majority approval, but in some
states, supermajority approval (the size of the required supermajority
varies).123 Sometimes, approval of debt is also an approval of an increased
tax to pay the bonds, or approval occurs concurrently with the approval of the
new tax. For example, California local governments must obtain the approval
of two-thirds of their voters voting on the matter (with smaller percentages
required for certain issuers in some circumstances) to issue general obligation
bonds, which also authorizes the increase in property taxes to pay those
bonds.124 Bonds payable from sales taxes also often require voter approval in
California.125 Local governments in Oregon must obtain approval of a
majority of their voters voting on the matter before issuing general obligation
bonds.126 In some states, debt limits of the type described in Section 5.1 above

121

Briffault, supra note 73, at 949.
See Gelfand, supra note 50, at 591 (noting that voters in a locality that wanted to borrow
in excess of a constitutional debt ceiling would need the support of voters throughout the
state to amend the ceiling and allow them to do so).
123
Salsich, supra note 60, at §§ 12.23, 12.30; Gillette, supra note 78, at 370.
124
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(2), (3); art. XVI, § 18(a), (b).
125
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 3.3.3. The sales taxes
themselves also require voter approval (by either a majority or 2/3 of those voting on the
matter, depending on the use of the tax proceeds). CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC. See also CAL.
DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 3.3.3.
126
OR. CONST. art. XI §§ 11(11)(d)(C)(ii), 11b(3)(b), 11L (these provisions allow property
taxes to be set at levels sufficient to cover debt service with voter approval); OR. REV. STATS.
§§ 287A.050, 287A.100 (2019).
122
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can be overridden with voter approval. 127 In others, there is only a voter
approval requirement, not a debt limit. 128
Sometimes, voters may be asked to approve debt only at certain
elections. For example, in Oregon, general obligation bonds must be
approved either at an election held in May or November, or at another
election at which a majority of registered voters cast ballots. 129 In California,
school districts may obtain approval of general obligation bonds for which
approval of only 55% of those voting on the matter (rather than two-thirds)
is required only at “a primary or general election, a regularly scheduled local
election at which all of the electors of the school district . . . are entitled to
vote, or at a statewide special election.” 130 Presumably these requirements are
imposed because voter turnout is higher at some elections than others.131
Instead of a voter approval requirement, some states provide a period
in which voters can petition to have an election concerning particular debt
(sometimes referred to as a “permissive referendum” or “backdoor
referendum”) for some local government bonds. For example, with limited
exceptions, bond resolutions adopted by towns and villages in New York are
not immediately effective. 132 Rather, the local government must publish a
notice that the resolution has been adopted, and during a 30-day period after
adoption, a petition may be filed signed by a specified number of voters
requesting that the voters of the town or village be given an opportunity to
vote on the bonds. 133 If no petition is filed within 30 days, the resolution

127

AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.2; Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.25.
Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.7.
129
OR. CONST. art. XI, §§ 11(8), 11k. Since it is rare for a majority of voters to cast ballots,
general obligation bond elections are usually held in May and November. LEAGUE OF OR.
CITIES, supra note 50, at 8.
130
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15266(a) (Deering 2021).
131
For example, one study covering the period from 2004-2006 found that voter turnout for
local elections held concurrently with national elections had an average turnout rate of 76%
during a presidential election year and 56% during congressional elections, while local
elections held in off-years or not at the same time as national elections had an aggregate
turnout rate of between 18-35% (the author suggests that the 35% reflects some states having
statewide elections at the same time). J. ERIC OLIVER, LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS
OF SMALL-SCALE DEMOCRACY 64–65 (2012).
132
N.Y. LOC. FIN. LAW §§ 35.00, 36.00 (McKinney 2021); GOODFRIEND & MYERS, BOND
BASICS FOR TOWNS, VILLAGES AND CITIES, supra note 107, at 28. In contrast, cities and
counties are often not subject to a permissive or mandatory referendum process (so no voter
approval is required) and school districts and fire districts are often subject to a mandatory
referendum process (so voter approval is always required). Id. at 30; MYERS & GOODFRIEND,
BOND BASICS FOR COUNTIES, supra note 107, at 25; GOODFRIEND & MYERS, BOND BASICS
FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS, supra note 107, at 29; MYERS & GOODFRIEND, BOND BASICS FOR
FIRE DISTRICTS supra note 107, at 23.
133
N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 90, 91 (McKinney 2021); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 9-900, 9-902
(McKinney 2021).
128
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becomes effective and the bonds may be issued.134 Illinois, Oregon and Texas
have similar procedures for some debt. 135
5.2.2. Voter Approval Requirements Should Be Carefully Considered
and Potentially Limited
Voter approval requirements should ensure that local government
officials are acting consistently with the desires of their constituents and that
community members are informed (or at least have the opportunity to be
informed) about proposed borrowing and major projects being financed.
Ideally, they also would promote interperiod equity. While voter approval
requirements are more successful in achieving these objectives than debt
limits are in achieving theirs, they are imperfect tools.
5.2.2.1. Benefits of Voter Approval Requirements
Voter approval requirements provide greater flexibility than debt
limits and improve the ability of the local government to respond to the
preferences of the community. 136 They likely also promote transparency.
States that require bond elections typically require that information be
provided to voters in a notice or the in the ballot measure itself. 137 For
example, California law requires that when any local government bond
measure is presented to voters, a statement indicating the specific purposes
of the bonds must be provided and that when a general obligation bond is
proposed to voters, a statement must be sent to voters including an estimate
of the average annual tax rate and the highest tax rate that will be required to
pay the bonds, the final year in which the tax rate is expected to be collected,
the year in which the tax rate is expected to be highest, and the estimated total
134

N.Y. TOWN LAW § 91 (McKinney 2021); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 9-902 (McKinney 2021).
See Kelly K. Kost & Anjali Vij, General Obligation and Revenue Bonds, in ILL. INST.
FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., MUNICIPAL LAW FINANCING, TAX, AND MUNICIPAL
PROPERTY §§ 2.20, 2.24 (2018) (describing the process that applies to some Illinois local
government bonds); LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, supra note 50, at 10, 13 (describing the process
that applies to some Oregon full faith and credit bonds and revenue bonds); THOMAS M.
POLLAN & DAVID MÉNDEZ, TEX. ASSOC. OF COUNTIES, 2017 PUBLIC FINANCE HANDBOOK
FOR TEXAS COUNTIES 20–21 (2017) (describing the process that applies to county certificates
of obligation).
136
See Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.7 (noting that voter approval requirements
“emphasize[] the principles of fiscal flexibility and local political responsiveness”); Kirk J.
Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 194 (2001) (noting in the context
of tax limits that while voter approval is “less reliable as a taxpayer protection device[,] . . .
it is more respectful of majoritarian preferences and local autonomy”). The same would be
true for voter approval as opposed to strict debt limits.
137
Salsich, supra note 60, at §§ 12.31, 12.32.
135
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principal and interest on the bonds.138 Oregon requires that ballot measures
for general obligation bonds include the amount of bonds to be authorized
and the purposes for which the proceeds are to be spent and a statement that
property taxes may increase.139 This means that community members have at
least some information about the proposed bonds and the project they are to
finance. In addition, it may be that having bond measures on the ballot
encourages more public discussion of the costs and benefits of the financing
and the project being financed.
Furthermore, notwithstanding that voters may have incentives to
borrow more or for a longer term than would be consistent with interperiod
equity as was noted above, some studies suggest that voter approval
requirements result in less debt that is subject to those requirements and
possibly less debt overall (though there are conflicting conclusions about the
impact on overall debt levels). 140 While many bond measures are approved
(for example, 73% of school bond measures proposed in California from
2008 through 2020 passed),141 some are not.
Furthermore, local government officials may be deterred from
pursuing financings unless they have a reasonable expectation that they will
be approved by voters, because presenting the measure to voters can be
costly, both in terms of out-of-pocket costs and politically. 142 The resulting
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9401 (Deering 2021); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53410 (Deering 2021).
LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, supra note 50, at 8. The estimated tax rates to pay debt service are
not required to be included, but they often are. Id.
140
See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.15 (citing several studies suggesting that
voter approval requirements reduce debt levels). One study of state borrowing found that
referendum requirements appeared to reduce the level of guaranteed debt, but the study also
found that the impact on nonguaranteed debt was not clear and that there were strong
indications that in these states more debt was simply issued by local governments rather than
the state. Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 119, at 84–86. This is not, of course, an option for
local governments, but in some states they may be able to issue through state authorities or
other local governments; this might have a similar effect. See also infra note 178 for
description of other studies.
141
School Bond Elections in California, BALLOTOPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/School_
bond_elections_in_California [https://perma.cc/ZA7V-VWAV].
142
See infra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. See also Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note
119, at 68 (“[P]ublic authorities probably do not put bond issues to voters unless the
likelihood of voter approval is reasonably high”). Government officials also may avoid
borrowing to finance projects if doing so is politically unpopular even absent a voter approval
requirement, because presumably there is a political cost to doing so. However, they may be
more inclined to approve a project and related borrowing when voter approval is not required
because the borrowing may garner less attention than a ballot measure would and because
they may hope that once community members are receiving the benefits of the facility, they
will feel more positive about the borrowing to the extent they consider it at all. Occasionally
when voters reject a bond measure, local government officials proceed to finance the project
using a method of borrowing that does not require voter approval. See infra note 177 for
further discussion and examples.
138
139
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lower level of borrowing may serve to counterbalance the incentives to
borrow more than is optimal (described above in Section 3.3.1).
5.2.2.2. Drawbacks of Voter Approval Requirements
Notwithstanding that voter approval requirements appear to be more
beneficial than debt limits, they do raise some concerns.
5.2.2.2.1. Voter Approval Requirements May Lead to
a Lower-than-Optimal Amount of Debt
There are reasons to believe that less than an optimal level of debt
may be approved by voters, and some have expressed concerns about whether
voter approval is an effective means for voters’ wishes to be met.
As was discussed in Section 3.3.1, current community members may
have the same interest in deferring payment of debt to the future that elected
officials do. But there are also reasons to believe that voters may not approve
enough borrowing or may not approve the right borrowing.
Supermajority requirements give a minority the ability to block a
financing desired by the majority. 143 The size of the supermajority matters.
For example, of the 857 ballot measures approved under a California law
permitting the issuance of general obligation bonds for school facilities with
approval of 55% of the voters, 488 would not have been approved had the
alternative requirement for approval by 2/3 of voters applied (meaning that
they were approved by more than 55% but fewer than 2/3 of voters voting on
the matter).144
In addition, it is not clear that voters are sufficiently informed enough
to make good decisions about financing matters. 145 Unless a measure receives
significant media attention (and this is rare), voters generally have little
information about the measures upon which they are voting, 146 Furthermore,
143

Schragger, supra note 71, at 870; see also Briffault, supra note 73, at 954 (noting that
supermajority requirements thwart majority wishes); Editorial: State Must End Supremely
Bad Supermajority for School Bonds, NEWS TRIB. (Apr. 28, 2018),
https://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/editorials/article210003224.html (describing
defeat of a school district bond measure in Washington State that received 59% of the vote
but not the 60% supermajority required to pass and advocating for the elimination of
supermajority requirements as undemocratic).
144
DAYTON, supra note 106, at 16.
145
See Briffault, supra note 73, at 953 (noting this concern).
146
Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1355 (1985) (reviewing
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1984)). See also Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters
Make Laws: How Direct Democracy is Shaping American Cities, 13 PUB. WORKS MGMT. &
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one study determined that the descriptions and analysis of ballot initiatives
included in voters’ handbooks prepared by states are written at the reading
level of a third year college student. 147 Presumably, many voters do not read
at this level. While bond measures may be easier to understand than many
ballot measures, voters may not always understand the matter on which they
are voting. Certainly, it is unlikely that voters generally have the expertise,
knowledge, or, often, incentive, to monitor a local government’s overall fiscal
health and the impact of borrowing on that health. 148 In addition, voters are
not likely to be presented with the details of the financing structure and
alternative methods of financing. Voters also are making decisions about
bond measures without knowing whether other bond measures on the ballot
will pass, or what bond measures may be on future ballots. 149 As a result, an
individual voter may approve either more or less debt than even that
individual voter would desire.
Questions also have been raised about whether those who actually
vote on ballot measures are representative of the electorate as a whole. 150
Only a portion of voters typically participates in elections in the United
States. Approximately two-thirds of people eligible to vote participated in the
November 2020 presidential election, and this was the highest turnout since
at least 1980.151 Turnout at elections that garner less attention, and in
particular at local elections, is typically much lower. 152 Even among those
POL’Y 39, 40, 47, 55–57 (2008) (describing case studies that showed that the amount of
information about bond measures varies significantly and discussing the low levels of voter
knowledge about many some ballot measures); Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett &
Matthew D. McCubbins, The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 317
(2010) (noting that a higher proportion of the information about ballot measures comes from
political campaigns than is the case for political candidates and that not every ballot measure
has a meaningful supporting and opposing campaign). Some states require certain
information be provided to voters. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
147
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 138 (1984). See also Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 146, at 55–56
(describing ballot pamphlets as “often dauntingly long and dense” and suggesting that while
information may be in the pamphlet, “it is not provided in a format that makes voting cues
accessible and salient to voters”)
148
See Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 658–64 (2012) (giving reasons residents likely are not effective
monitors of a local government’s fiscal health); Richard C. Schragger, Citizen v Bondholder,
39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 790 (2012) (noting that any one citizen has “little incentive,
little expertise, and little time to monitor local fiscal health”).
149
Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 146, at 45.
150
See Briffault, supra note 73, at 953 (noting this concern).
151
Drew Desilver, Turnout Soared in 2020 as Nearly Two-Thirds of Eligible U.S. Voters
Cast Ballots for President, PEW R ESEARCH C ENTER (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/28/turnout-soared-in-2020-as-nearly-twothirds-of-eligible-u-s-voters-cast-ballots-for-president/ [https://perma.cc/8DGF-XEDV].
152
See supra note 131.
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who do vote in a particular election, some do not vote on ballot measures. 153
Those who vote on ballot measures may not represent the community as a
whole. Studies suggest that more educated and older people are more likely
to vote at all and that of those who vote, those with more education are more
likely to vote on ballot measures. 154 Another study suggests that educated
homeowners who are long-term residents may be more likely to vote in local
elections than others are, and that any bias caused by low voter turnout is
likely to lead to “policies that protect property values and suppress property
taxes.”155 At least for general obligation bonds that are payable from property
taxes, the result may be that those who vote are more likely to oppose a bond
measure, absent a clear connection between the project financed and higher
property values.
Furthermore, local governments that need to obtain voter approval
may seek it for a lower amount of bonds than the voters would approve. A
study of school boards found that school boards typically propose a lower
amount of borrowing than that for which they could obtain voter approval. 156
The authors of the study attribute this to the costs of the election and selling
the bonds and because of uncertainty about voter preferences. 157 It is likely
that other local governments behave in a similar manner to school boards.
Furthermore, local governments may not put a bond measure on the ballot at
all if it is not expected to pass, possibly by a substantial margin. 158

The amount of “dropoff” (the percentage of people who vote in an election but not on a
particular measure or candidate) varies but can be substantial. See MAGLEBY, supra note 147,
at 90–95 (reporting dropoff rates for a variety of measures in several elections, including a
13% dropoff rate for bonds in the 1976 California election and a 15% dropoff rate for bonds
in the 1978 California election).
154
MAGLEBY, supra note 147, at 80–82, 104–11. Other factors also correlate to turnout and
proposition voting, including occupation, income, education, age, race, perceived social class
and gender. Id.
155
OLIVER, supra note 131, at 55–56.
156
Ed Balsdon et al., Private Demands for Public Capital: Evidence from School Bond
Referenda, 54 J. URB. ECON. 610, 612 (2003). But see Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 146,
at 41 (suggesting that a local government can theoretically receive approval for a higher level
of debt than would be the voter’s ideal preference because the voter is presented with a “takeit-or-leave-it” offer).
157
Balsdon et al., supra note 156, at 612.
158
See FAIRBANK, MASLIN, MAULLIN, METZ & ASSOCIATES, INC., NOVEMBER 2020
ELECTION OBSERVATIONS FROM FM3 RESEARCH 2 (2020) http://californiacityfinance.com/
Votes2011final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKR7-GDDY] (while sometimes local governments
put measures on the ballot when it does not appear certain that they will pass, they appeared
to have been less likely to do so in California at the November 2020 after a relatively high
proportion of measures failed to pass at the March 2020 election).
153
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5.2.2.2.2. Voter Approval Requirements Increase
Costs and May Cause Delays.
Even if local governments do not campaign in favor of a ballot
measure (at least some states prohibit such campaigning), 159 they incur
financial costs in deciding whether to put a bond measure on the ballot and
preparing the measure for the ballot. For example, local governments may
hire lawyers and political consultants to assist with the ballot measure and
election process and pay for a voter survey to determine whether to propose
a ballot measure. 160 They also incur costs of running the election. 161 In
addition to these costs, and perhaps more significantly, there is a political cost
to proposing a bond measure. Elected officials “desire to remain in the good
graces of the community and its voters and fear that frequent requests for
property tax increases will jeopardize this.” 162

159

See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 7054 (Deering 2021) (prohibiting the use of school district
or community college district funds, services, supplies, or equipment to urge support of or
opposition to any ballot measure, excepting impartial factual information); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 54964 (Deering 2021) (prohibiting local government officials from spending public
funds to support of oppose a ballot measure except to provide impartial information about
relevant facts); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-25.1 (LexisNexis 2021) (prohibiting the
expenditure of public funds to campaign for or against a candidate or ballot measure but
permitting the use of public funds to provide factual information); TEX. ELEC. CODE §
255.003(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (prohibiting the spending of public funds for political
advertising except for communications that merely describe factually the purpose of the
measure).
160
See, e.g., CAL. COAL. FOR ADEQUATE SCH. HOUS., PROPOSITION 39 BEST PRACTICES
HANDBOOK 27–30 (2003), https://cashnet.org/resource/resmgr/resourcedocuments/prop_
39_handbook_2003_s.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6JK-BTZ3] (describing the role of bond
counsel and political consultants and identifying voter surveys as a permitted use of public
funds); TEX. ASSOC. OF SCH. BDS., OVERVIEW OF A SCHOOL DISTRICT BOND ISSUANCE
(2020), https://www.tasb.org/services/legal-services/tasb-school-law-esource/business/
documents/overview-of-school-district-bond-issuance.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9X2-GAUP]
(identifying retaining bond counsel and an election attorney as steps to take when
determining whether to issue bonds and including publicity and communication as
components of ordering the election); LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, supra note 52, at 131 (noting
the importance of hiring an outside expert to assess voter understanding of and support for
the proposed measure); Balsdon et al., supra note 156, at 618 n.14 (stating that school district
funds can be used to conduct a survey of the community and provide guidance on how much
should be requested and noting that this cost between $30,000-$40,000).
161
See CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 106, at 138 (noting that if the
election fails, the local government will usually have to pay the costs of the election out of
its general fund); Lynda Roberts, Election Costs and Billing, COUNTY OF MARIN,
https://www.marincounty.org/depts/rv/election-info/election-costs-and-billing
[https://perma.cc/2E5J-LE7G] (describing election costs charged by the county to cities,
school districts and special districts).
162
Balsdon et al., supra note 156, at 618.
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In addition, determining whether to put a measure on the ballot and
preparing for the election takes time. One expert indicates that it can take six
to nine months, or even longer, from beginning election proceedings to
issuing the bonds.163 This does not include the time to determine whether to
pursue a bond election at all. In some states, bond measures may be presented
at only certain elections. 164 When projects are urgently needed or when
construction costs are rising rapidly, these delays may create problems for
local governments.
5.2.3. Voter Approval Requirements Should be Carefully Evaluated
Voter approval requirements, particularly those that require
supermajority approval, should be carefully evaluated. However, it does
appear that they contribute to providing information to community members
and to protecting community members from local government officials who
may be inclined to borrow more than community members would prefer.
Requirements that specific information be provided to voters in an easily
understandable format may make voter approval requirements more
valuable.165
It is less clear whether they help promote interperiod equity. In all
likelihood, any impact they have on interperiod equity is fairly small. As was
noted in Section 3.3.1, current community members may have the same
interest in deferring payment of debt to the future that elected officials do. It
is possible, however, that because of the factors discussed in Section
5.2.2.2.1, voter approval requirements result in less debt being incurred than
the community would prefer. This may counterbalance tendencies to issue
more debt than is appropriate. However, although voters generally approve
the principal amount and use of debt (and may be given some other
information, such as the expected impact on tax rates), this is an incomplete
protection of interperiod equity because it does not prevent debt service from
being disproportionately pushed to later years.166
If voter approval requirements are used, they ideally would be
consistent for different types of debt. This is not always the case. For
163

GREG HARRINGTON, JOHN HARTENSTEIN, & DONALD FIELD, THE XYZS OF CALIFORNIA
SCHOOL DISTRICT DEBT FINANCING 28 (Orrick, 3d ed. 2015), https://www.orrick.com/en/
Insights/2007/03/The-XYZs-of-California-School-District-Debt-Financing [https://perma.
cc/DXW3-QRCA]; see also POLLAN & MÉNDEZ, supra note 135, at 12 (indicating that it
takes 5-12 months, or even longer, to issue general obligation bonds).
164
See generally notes 129–130 and accompanying text.
165
For examples of some current requirements, see supra note 137–39 and accompanying
text.
166
This is because voters approve the amount of debt, not terms of the debt such as the
maturity structure. For discussion of other ways that maturity and amortization schedules of
bonds could be regulated, see Section 6.2.3.

Vol. 7:2]

Beyond a “Bond-Aid” Approach

355

example, under California law, different voter approval requirements apply
depending on the purpose and payment source of the bonds and other
factors.167 In some states, supermajority requirements are imposed for general
obligation bonds, but not revenue bonds. 168 As is discussed in greater detail
in the following section, some types of debt are typically not subject to voter
approval requirements at all.
One alternative to voter approval requirements short of eliminating
them entirely would be to ensure that there is appropriate notice of and ability
to participate in board meetings at which bonds are approved, and a waiting
period afterwards in which a specified number of voters could require that
the measure be voted upon at the next election. 169 This would shift the burden
of convincing voters from the elected governing body to the objecting
voters.170 As was described above, some states allow voters to petition to put
certain types of debt on the ballot. 171 There could be merit in broadening this
approach to cover a wider range of debt. However, it would be important that
the hurdles are set at the appropriate level; making it too easy for a handful
of voters to compel an election defeats the purpose of using a permissive
referendum process rather than a mandatory one, and making it too difficult
or too expensive would be little different from having no voter approval
requirement.172
5.3. Exceptions to Debt Limits and Voter Approval Have Distorted
Borrowing Decisions
Courts and legislatures have created numerous exceptions to both
debt limits and voter approval requirements, and the avoidance of these limits
and requirements has “fundamentally shaped public finance.” 173 General
obligation bonds are typically subject to these restrictions, but they often do
not apply to revenue bonds (though some voter approval requirements do

167

See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.30.
169
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommended permissive
referendum requirements in 1961. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL.,
supra note 50, at 72–73.
170
Id. at 73.
171
See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
172
The challenges of obtaining signatures for initiatives (legislation proposed by voters) are
discussed in MAGLEBY, supra note 147, at 61–70 (1984). Those gathering signatures for a
permissive referendum likely would encounter similar issues.
173
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.1; see also Briffault, supra note 73, at 925, citing
WILLIAM D. VALENTE, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 647 (William D. Valente ed., 5 th ed. 2001) (noting that two-thirds of city and county
debt is exempt from debt limits).
168

356

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[May 2022

apply to some revenue bonds).174 Avoiding debt limits is so common that
guides to municipal finance have sections with titles like “Devices Employed
to Avoid Debt Ceilings and Procedural Requirements” 175 and “Common
Strategies for Avoiding the Debt Limit.” 176 Local governments sometimes
simply issue a different form of debt than they might otherwise to avoid the
limits and restrictions.177 It is not clear whether the end result is a lower
amount of local government debt than there would be without the limits and
approval requirements.178
What is clear is that the result is more expensive debt and less
transparency. Interest rates on revenue bonds are generally higher than on
general obligation bonds, and legal and administrative costs for revenue
bonds are typically higher.179 The debt burdens borne by local governments
174

Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.14; Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.23; see also Gillette,
supra note 4, at 1256–57 (describing some of the exceptions from debt limits).
175
See generally Gelfand, supra note 88, at pt. IV.
176
See generally CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 1.3.
177
See, e.g., Shama Gamkhar & Jerome Olson, Factors Affecting School District Choice of
Bonds, 2002 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. OF ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N, 396, 405 (concluding that
school districts in Texas that are less likely to win a bond election are more likely to issue
lease revenue bonds, which generally do not require voter approval); Gillette, supra note 78,
at 375–78 (describing instances of local governments financing projects by methods that do
not require voter approval after losing a bond election); Richard Williamson, Certificates of
Obligation Fund Austin Courthouse After Voters Rejected Bonds, BOND BUYER (May 13,
2019), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/certificates-of-obligation-deal-bypasses-voterson-austin-courthouse [https://perma.cc/T7XF-N7TA] (describing funding of courthouse
with a different form of debt that does not require voter approval three-and-a-half years after
voters rejected a general obligation bond measure for the same project).
178
See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 3 (noting
that while debt limits may have restrained local government borrowing, the extent to which
they are effective cannot be measured); AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.15 (citing
several studies suggesting that voter approval requirements reduce debt levels); Briffault,
supra note 73, at 925 (noting that while there may have been some impact on total debt
levels, it does not seem significant); Paul G. Farnham, Re-examining Local Debt Limits: A
Disaggregated Analysis, 51 S. ECON. J. 1186, 1195–96 (2001) (indicating that referenda
requirements do not affect overall debt levels, but that debt limits do reduce the amount of
both general obligation and overall borrowing); Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 119, at 78–
82, 85–86, 93 (concluding that at the state level, referendum requirements and prohibitions
on borrowing appeared to reduce the level of guaranteed debt, though limits based on
revenues are somewhat less effective, and that states do not appear to issue nonguaranteed
government in lieu of guaranteed debt, but that that there were strong indications that in these
states more debt was simply issued by local governments and authorities rather than the
state).
179
See, e.g., LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, supra note 50, at 7 (noting that general obligation bonds
“are regarded as very secure and are usually the least expensive way for a city to borrow
money”); MARLOWE, RIVENBARK & VOGT, supra note 37, at 159 (“interest rates on GO
bonds are usually lower than rates on other types of long-term debt used to finance capital
projects”); Briffault, supra note 73, at 926 (noting higher interest rates and greater
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are less visible, and government structures are more complicated and public
authorities and agencies that are not necessarily run by elected officials play
more significant roles.180
In addition, local governments may give up future budgeting
flexibility and may be subject to more restrictive covenants when they issue
revenue bonds rather than general obligation bonds. Revenue bond
documents typically include requirements that the revenues from which the
bonds are paid are tracked separately and can be used only for specified
purposes in a specified order. 181 The documents also typically include
covenants that that restrict future flexibility, such as restrictions on the ability
to issue new bonds, insurance requirements, and covenants that rates be set
at levels to cover debt service and maintain reserves (sometimes with
additional cushion).182
Furthermore, local government decisions about which projects to
finance and construct may be distorted by differing approval requirements for
different types of bonds. Projects that would typically be financed with
general obligation bonds or other bonds requiring voter approval may be less
likely to be undertaken, while those more typically financed with revenue
bonds or other types of bonds that are not subject to the same restrictions may
be more likely to proceed. Riskier projects that cannot be financed at
reasonable interest rates without also including a pledge of taxing authority
may be less likely to be undertaken, even when the projects are desired by

administrative and legal costs); Gelfand, supra note 50, at 560–61 (noting that interest rates
on revenue bonds are typically higher than on general obligation bonds); Gillette, supra note
4, at 1257 (noting higher interest rates and additional costs to develop legal alternatives);
Shoked, supra note 31 (noting that debt limits force local governments to pay higher interest
rates and generate administrative expenses, among other things).
180
See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 3 (“Debt
restrictions have tended to impair the public accountability and responsiveness of local
governments in various ways, including the promotion of special districts and various kind
of financing authorities, and the complication and obfuscation of financial arrangements.”);
Briffault, supra note 73, at 926 (the avoidance of debt limits has contributed to the “baroque
structure of state and local government, and the major role played by un-elected public
authorities and similar agencies”); Gamkhar & Olson, supra note 177, at 402 (noting that
lease revenue bonds “can be concealed from voters since they are not legally required to be
included as debt in the district’s budget or financial statements” notwithstanding that credit
rating agencies and other bond market participants would consider them as debt); Gillette,
supra note 4, at 1257 (“circumvention of debt limitations obfuscates the locality’s true debt
position”).
181
See O’HARA, supra note 16, at 199–200 (describing typical provisions); ADVISORY
COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 56–57 (noting that revenue bonds
tend to come with earmarking arrangements that can narrow budgetary discretion).
182
See MARLOWE, RIVENBARK & VOGT, supra note 37, at 164–65 (describing typical
provisions); O’HARA, supra note 16, at 201–202 (describing typical provisions).
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the local community.183 New housing developments with new schools and
other public facilities may be favored over rebuilding or building a new
school in an existing community when it is easier to issue municipal bonds
to finance facilities in new developments. 184
None of this is to say that revenue bonds shouldn’t be used or that
they don’t serve important purposes. However, any debt limits or voter
authorization requirements should “take cognizance of all forms of local
borrowing and debt” and “should be designed to facilitate—rather than
hamper—intelligent choice among suitable alternative forms of
borrowing.”185 Different types of debt should be treated differently only if
there is a sound basis for doing so. For example, there is a reasonable
argument that short-term debt might be treated differently since it does not
give rise to the same issues of interperiod equity,186 though other restrictions
(such as the term and the amount that can be borrowed) would be appropriate
to prevent misuse.187 Exceptions for emergencies or to meet legal mandates
(such as to satisfy a tort judgment) also may be reasonable, at least if
appropriately tailored.188 It also would be reasonable to treat debt for which
the bondholders alone bear the risk of project failure differently than debt for
which the community bears the risk, and one commentator suggests that this
analysis may go a long way (albeit not the whole way) towards explaining
exceptions from debt limits. 189
A fundamental question, then, is whether there is a good reason to
subject general obligation bonds payable from property taxes to greater
restrictions than other debt. For some types of facilities typically financed
with revenue bonds, such as an airport paid for by airline rates and charges,
a convention center paid for with hotel taxes from surrounding hotels, or an
express lane financed by tolls, the answer likely is “yes” (at least if the local
government is not obligated to pay any bonds from other sources should the
relevant revenue sources prove inadequate). These are all facilities that a
community member can truly elect whether or not to use (and that can be
used by people other than members of the community). The answer for
Gillette, supra note 4, at 1258–59 (noting that these projects compete with “more
traditional capital expenditures for a limited amount of permissible debt”).
184
See Shanske, supra note 118, at 668 (2010) (arguing that a particular type of bond that is
typically approved by the developer before homes in a new development are sold has
contributed to urban sprawl).
185
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 4.
186
Some state courts “readily” reached this conclusion. Sterk & Goldman, supra note 73, at
1314.
187
See Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.9 (noting that overuse and abuse prompted states to
impose limits on short-term debt).
188
See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.4 for further discussion of these types of
exceptions and how courts have created and interpreted them.
189
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 4.1.1.
183
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utilities such as water and wastewater systems is less clear, since even though
residents may be able to cut back on their use of these utilities, it is unlikely
that they can avoid using them entirely. For financing structures that use
general fund revenues to finance a facility but are not treated as debt, such as
some lease revenue bonds, the better answer in my view is that they should
be treated the same as (or at least similarly to) general obligation bonds, even
if bondholders take the risk that the local government will not appropriate
funds to make the payment. General fund moneys that are used to pay the
debt service to finance the facility could be used for other purposes (or taxes
and fees could be reduced) if they were not used to pay debt service, and the
local government likely will feel pressure to appropriate funds to repay the
debt even if it is not legally obligated to do so because its ability to borrow in
the future likely would be affected by a failure to pay.
Ideally, a broader range of debt would be treated more similarly for
purposes of debt ceilings and voter approval rights. Treating debt similarly
would lead to greater transparency (and hence public opportunity to
participate) and to better financial decisions (because decisions about
transaction structure would be based on the economics of the transaction
rather than avoiding a debt ceiling or voter approval right). It is likely that
fewer exceptions would also simplify the laws governing local government
borrowing. That said, for the reasons discussed in Section 5.1.2, ideally debt
ceilings would be eliminated. Where they remain, exceptions likely will be
needed, and allowing a state agency to provide waivers of them in appropriate
circumstance may be desirable. In contrast, it may be appropriate for some
voter approval requirements to be retained in some form (perhaps providing
for permissive referenda) and to apply to a broader range of debt.
6. REGULATION OF USE OF PROCEEDS, TERMS AND SALE OF BONDS
State laws restrict the purposes for which bonds can be issued, the
terms of the bonds, and the mechanics for sale of the bonds. Each of these
topics is addressed below. Some states also regulate other details of the bonds
such as who can sign them and how they should be printed. These more
administrative points are not addressed below. Suffice it to say that any
provisions relating to purely administrative matters should be kept as flexible
as possible to avoid unnecessary expense or requirements that are not
consistent with standard practices in the bond market as it has evolved and
continues to evolve. If states do regulate detailed terms of bonds or
administrative points, legislatures may want to delegate to a state agency the
power to create appropriate regulations since these will be easier to change
over time than a statute or constitutional provision would be.
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6.1. Restrictions on the Use of Bond Proceeds
Every state has restrictions on the purposes for which local
governments can use their funds, including bond proceeds. 190 Some have
additional restrictions on the use of bond proceeds, as described below.191
6.1.1. Public Purpose Requirements and Prohibitions on the Lending
of Public Credit
Local governments generally may expend funds only for public
purposes.192 Because proceeds of local government borrowing are public
funds, these provisions apply to the use of bond proceeds. The intent of these
provisions is to “restrict public funding to activities that serve the interests of
the public at large.”193 Some public purpose restrictions are in state
constitutions, and others have been created by courts.194 What has been
considered a public purpose has evolved over time,195 and in virtually all
states public purposes may include economic development programs that
provide direct assistance to individual businesses. 196 Courts tend to defer to
legislative findings of public purpose, 197 and public purpose requirements are
“largely rhetorical” today. 198 Nonetheless, requiring that public funds be used
for public purposes (even if such purposes are defined very broadly), and
retaining for courts the ability to decide in controversial cases whether a

190

AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 3.1.
The use of local government bond proceeds is also restricted by the Establishment Clause
of the U.S. Constitution; this is particularly relevant when bond proceeds are used to assist
schools, hospitals, and other organizations with religious affiliations. For a brief discussion,
see id. at § 3.4. In addition, the Internal Revenue Code and U.S. Treasury Department
regulations also impose restrictions on the use of proceeds of tax-exempt bonds. For a short
description of some of the restrictions for tax-exempt bonds, see CAL. DEBT & INV.
ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at §§ 4.4, 4.6.
192
Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.11; NAT’L ASSOC. OF BOND LAWYERS, SECTION 1:
GENERAL LAW, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS LAW 2012 6 (2012); Briffault, supra
note 73, at 910.
193
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 3.1.
194
See id. at § 3.2 for discussion of both.
195
See, e.g., id. at § 3.5 (what constitutes a public purpose “changes to meet new
developments and conditions of times”) (quoting In re Limited Tax Gen. Obligation Bonds
of the City of Edmonds, 256 P.3d 1242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)); Gelfand, supra note 88, at
§ 11.11 (“the concept has evolved through the case law to meet changing conditions”).
196
Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.11; Briffault, supra note 73, at 913.
197
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at §§ 3.5.3, 3.5.4; Briffault, supra note 73, at 945–46.
198
Briffault, supra note 73, at 914.
191
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purpose is public, serves the objective of protecting citizens from bad
decisions by local government officials.199
In addition, most states prohibit local governments from making gifts
or loans of public credit to private parties and investing in private enterprises,
presumably to restrict the ability of individuals or companies to benefit at the
expense of the public. 200 These provisions, like public purpose provisions,
can limit the use of bond proceeds. Even if a gift of public credit serves a
public purpose, it may be prohibited by these provisions, absent an
exception.201
While there are often exceptions to these provisions,202 they do
sometimes constrain local governments from undertaking activities that the
community deems desirable. For example, in 2018, Oregon voters approved
a constitutional amendment adding an exception to the state’s constitutional
prohibition on the lending of public credit and investing in private enterprises
that would allow local governments to invest with private developers in
affordable housing projects.203 Supporters indicated that the amendment was
needed because the constitutional prohibition constrained the ability of local
governments to collaborate on much-needed affordable housing projects. 204
However, like public purpose requirements, restrictions on lending of public
credit (at least with appropriate exceptions) generally impose appropriate
constraints on local governments and should be retained.
6.1.2. Other Restrictions
Bond proceeds may be used only for valid purposes of the local
government.205 General obligation bond proceeds typically may be used only
for “land acquisition, construction and equipping of traditional public
projects such as courthouses, hospitals, jails, libraries, schools, sewage
199

Additional statutory provisions may be valuable, too. See id. at 947 (noting that statutory
requirements for better record keeping and public disclosure of the public benefits of
economic development might be more effective than judicial enforcement).
200
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 22, at § 3.7; Gelfand, supra note 88, at § 11.10. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
201
Id.
202
Supra note 200; see also CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 7.3
(describing broad court-created public purpose exceptions to California’s prohibition).
203
Oregon Measure 102, Removes Restriction that Affordable Housing Projects Funded by
Municipal Bonds be Government Owned (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Oregon_Measure_102,_Removes_Restriction_that_Affordable_Housing_Projects_Funded
_by_Municipal_Bonds_be_Government_Owned (2018) [https://perma.cc/33TZ-W8TC].
204
Id.; Dirk VanderHart, Oregon’s Constitution Has Shackled Portland’s $258 Million
Housing Bond, Portland Mercury (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.portlandmercury.com/news/
2018/01/17/19611094/oregons-constitution-has-shackled-portlands-258-million-housingbond [https://perma.cc/UX4W-RU8Z].
205
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.38.
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treatment facilities, and streets and roads.” 206 Some states allow general
obligation bonds to be used for a broader range of purposes. 207 The use of
proceeds of other types of bonds also may be restricted by state law. 208
Where voter approval is required, the use of proceeds may be limited
to the purposes approved by the voters or there may be additional steps that
need to be taken for them to be applied to other purposes. Some have
described the voter approval of a bond measure as creating a contract between
the issuer and the voters; this contract would limit the use of bond proceeds
to the purposes approved by the voters.209 The concept that proceeds cannot
be used for purposes other than those approved by the voters sometimes also
appears in statues. For example, California law provides that proceeds of
local government general obligation bonds may be used only for the purposes
for which the bond were issued. 210 Should there be any proceeds remaining
after the purpose is completed, it sometimes is required to be used to pay debt
service on the bonds. 211 Some states provide more flexibility. In Georgia, for
example, if proceeds of bonds remain after the project approved by the voters
is completed, or circumstances change such that the approved project would
be obsolete or wasteful, unexpended bond proceeds must either be used for a
substantially similar purpose or to repay the bonds or other bonds, as

206

Id. at § 12.4.
For example, California cities can use general obligation bonds to finance loans to private
landowners for seismic safety improvements, to finance redevelopment projects in blighted
areas and to finance “other works, property, or structures necessary or convenient to carry
out the objects, purposes, and powers of the city” and home rule cities have broader powers
to borrow using general obligation bonds. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 43601, 43602 (Deering
2021); CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 106, at 136. In Illinois, general
obligation bonds can be used to finance wind generation turbine farms and redevelopment
projects in blighted areas. Kelly K. Kost & Vij, supra note 135, at § 2.5.
208
See, e.g., CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 106, at ch. 6 (identifying the
types of projects that may be financed with each type of financing described).
209
See, e.g., id. at 13; Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.23. The contract consists of the
applicable law, the bond resolution, the ballot measure. Id. Related costs such as funding a
reserve fund, capitalized interest and costs of issuance are typically also permissible uses as
described in the following paragraph.
210
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53410 (Deering 2021). Also see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15146(g)–(j)
(Deering 2021) (requiring virtually all proceeds of school district bonds to be deposited in
the building fund and used for the purposes for which the bonds were issued and allowing a
portion to be used for capitalized interest, reserves, and costs of issuance).
211
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 43628 (Deering 2021) (the proceeds of general obligation
bonds issued by general law cities must be used for the purpose for which the bonds were
issued or for capitalized interest; once such purpose is achieved, any excess must be used to
pay debt service on the bonds until they are paid in full and then can be used for other
purposes); N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 165.00(a) (McKinney 2021) (providing that bond
proceeds may be applied only to the purpose for which the bonds were issued or to pay debt
service on the bonds).
207
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determined by a two-thirds vote of the governing body of the local
government.212
In addition to the primary purpose of the issuance, bond proceeds are
typically allowed to be used to fund a reserve fund (available to pay debt
service for a short period of time if the local government does not pay), to
pay costs of issuing the bonds (such as bond counsel and disclosure counsel
fees, printer costs, underwriter’s fees and municipal advisor fees), and
sometimes to pay interest on the bonds until shortly after a project is
completed (sometimes referred to as “capitalized interest.”213 These purposes
are consistent with the those permitted for tax-exempt bonds under federal
tax law.214 A state may want to have its own requirements rather than relying
on federal tax law requirements not only because the state may have different
perspectives on the purposes for which local governments should be allowed
to borrow than the federal government or even other states do, but also
because not all bonds are subject to the federal tax law requirements, federal
tax law requirements can change without the approval of any state, and
because the focus of the federal tax restrictions is the circumstances under
which the federal government should subsidize borrowing, not when local
governments should be able to borrow.
Some states have additional restrictions on the use of proceeds, and
these can be problematic. For example, some California local governments
may use premium received from the sale of certain bonds only to pay interest
on the bonds.215 These provisions likely are intended to discourage issuers
from borrowing more than the authorized amount of bonds by selling them at
a premium.216 However, the provisions can lead to undesirable outcomes
when market conditions are such that the best price on the bonds can be
obtained if they are sold at a premium. The bonds must be priced without
premium notwithstanding the market conditions, or a small amount of interest
212

JAMES P. MONACELL, GEORGIA PUBLIC FINANCE HANDBOOK § 3.2.5 (2018). See also
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47–5 (LexisNexis 2020) (permitting application of county general
obligation bonds proceeds to purposes other than those for which the bonds were issued or
to the repayment of the bonds, in either case with the approval of 2/3 of the members of the
county council).
213
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.38.
214
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at §§ 4.4.2–4.4.4 (describing
permitted uses and some limitations).
215
For example, California school districts generally are required to use any premium
received from the sale of general obligation bonds to pay debt service. CAL. EDUC. CODE §
15146(g) (Deering 2021). Similar requirements apply to some bonds issued by various transit
districts. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 40246, 50246, 70246, 96471, 98341, 101311
(Deering 2021). But see notes 217–18 and accompanying text for discussion of the use of
premium to pay costs of issuance.
216
See supra note 15–18 and infra 222–25 and accompanying text for further discussion of
sale of bonds at a premium.
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must be capitalized rather than being used for the project, regardless of
whether the issuer wishes to do so. Either option increases the cost of the
bonds to the issuer.
Limits on the use of premium received by California school districts,
combined with a limit (equal to 2% of the proceeds of the bonds) on the
amount of school district general obligation bond proceeds that can be
deposited into a costs of issuance account and be used to pay costs of
issuance, 217 have contributed to the practice many California school districts
have used of issuing bonds at a premium and using the funds generated to
pay costs of issuance without ever being “received” by the district, despite
criticism of this practice. 218 Any limit on the amount of bond proceeds that
can be used to pay costs of issuance is likely to be particularly burdensome
for smaller issuances because some costs do not vary proportionately with
the size of the issuance. 219
Counting the premium towards the authorized amount as is discussed
in Section 6.2.1 below would be a better solution to the problem of issuers
generating excessive premium, as would restricting the amount of premium
that can be generated as a percentage of the principal amount of the bonds
217

CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 15146(h) (Deering 2021). Depending how one interprets the statute,
this could mean that if costs of issuance are over 2% a portion of them must be paid from
principal in the building fund, increasing the administrative burden because they are paid
from two accounts rather than one, or even they cannot be paid from amounts received by
the school district.
218
See Jason Chung, Selling at Premium: How School Districts Can Pay Costs of Issuance,
FIELDMAN ROLAPP & ASSOCIATES SCH. FIN. NEWS (Oct. 2012) available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20150925234627/http://www.fieldman.com/Newsletters/SFN/
10-12%20Article2.html (describing the practice of paying costs of issuance from premium
and noting criticism of it, but indicating that the practice is legal and generally accepted);
Letter from Kamala D. Harris, Att’y Gen., State of Cal., to Wendy H. Wiles, Robert E.
Anslow & Jeffrey A. Hoskinson, Bowie, Arneson, Wiles & Giannone, Poway Unified Sch.
Dist. v. All Persons Interested, Sup. Ct. of Cal., Cty. of San Diego, Case No. 37-201000106255–CU–MC–CTI (Mar. 2011) (expressing concern about the legality of using
premium to pay costs of issuance); Rich Saskal, California Schools on Notice, BOND BUYER
(Mar.
10,
2011),
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/california-schools-on-notice
[https://perma.cc/9QKD-XEDC] (describing this use of premium as a common practice,
providing an example of the underwriter paying costs of issuance from premium, and
describing the California attorney general’s response).
219
See Marc Joffe, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society Research Brief, Doubly
Bound: The Costs of Issuing Municipal Bonds 12 (2015), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/
sites/default/files/haasinstituterefundamerica_doublybound_cost_of_issuingbonds_publish.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EK23-QM7C] (noting that issuance costs are proportionately higher
for smaller bond issuances and that there are certain costs associated with any bond issuance
regardless of the amount issue); David Brodsly & Charles Turner, CDIAC Seminar: Session
Five: Cost of Issuance 10 (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/seminars/
2015/20150317/day1/5.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF8A-REPC] (while financial advisor and
bond counsel fees were lower for smaller issues, as a percentage of the principal amount
issued they were higher).
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using an amount that is high enough not to interfere with normal market
practices but low enough to prevent issuers issuing bonds at unusually high
premiums as a way to generate more bond proceeds while complying with
limits on the principal amount that can be borrowed.
Limiting the use of bond proceeds to purposes for which the local
government could spend its other funds ensures that the government is acting
within its intended scope and is not encouraged to borrow simply because
that is the only way it can spend for a particular purpose, thus protecting
citizens from poor decisions made by local governments. Limiting the use of
bond proceeds to capital projects and related costs (including costs of issuing
the bonds and reserve funds securing the bonds) gives future citizens some
protection from being disproportionately burdened by debt by limiting the
use of debt to projects that are most clearly going to provide benefits over the
term of the debt. While other uses likely would provide future benefits (for
example, job training programs for the unemployed, supportive programs for
the homeless, or higher quality education for children well might provide
benefits for many years to come), these benefits are often more amorphous
and uncertain. Limiting the use of proceeds of voter-approved bonds to the
purposes that were authorized by the voters (or related or similar purposes)
is essential to maintain the meaningfulness of a voter approval requirement.
Other limits on the use of proceeds should be carefully considered before
being imposed. As with the examples above, some have the effect of adding
unnecessary complications or distorting the process of determining the terms
or pricing of bonds, both of which are inconsistent with transparency and
sound decision-making.
6.2. Restrictions on Terms of Bonds
6.2.1. Limits on Principal Amount
When voters or governing boards approve bonds, they usually
approve a maximum principal amount to be issued. Sometimes state laws
require that this information be included. For example, Texas law requires
that the ballot proposition requesting approval of general obligation bonds
include, among other things, “the total principal amount of the debt
obligations to be authorized.”220 Governing board authorizing resolutions

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 52.072(f) (LexisNexis 2021); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1251.052(a)(2)
(LexisNexis 2021). Other states have similar requirements. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §
15122 (Deering 2021) (stating that the amount of bonds must be included for school district
bond measures); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4-2 (LexisNexis 2021) (stating that the form
of question to the voters includes the amount of the bonds).
220
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typically include the maximum principal amount of bonds to be issued. 221
The debt limits described in Section 5.1.1 also are framed in the context of
the principal amount of debt outstanding.
However, municipal bonds are typically sold at a discount or a
premium, which is reflected in the amount received by the issuer (the
“proceeds”) from the sale. 222 Limits tied to the amount actually borrowed
rather than the principal amount of the bonds would promote transparency,
because limits would be based on the economics of the transaction. 223 In
addition, limits tied to the amount borrowed rather than the principal amount
would remove incentives issuers have to avoid original issue discount, which
results in issuers receiving less than the principal amount of the bonds, or to
maximize premium, which results in issuers receiving more than the principal
amount of the bonds, and instead allow issuers to price the bonds with
whatever premium or discount provided the lowest yield on the bonds. 224 This
would also eliminate any need for provisions restricting the use of premium
such as those discussed above. 225

221

See, e.g., Jacquelynne Jennings, Schiff Hardin LLP, California Debt & Investment
Advisory Commission Municipal Debt Essentials Day 2: Planning a Bond Sale Session Five:
Bond Documents 9 (Feb. 13, 2019), available at https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/
seminars/2019/20190212/day2/5.pdf [https://perma.cc/88TQ-J587] (describing the
“maximum principal amount of bonds to be issued” as a key provision of the issuer’s
resolution authorizing the bonds); GOODFRIEND & MYERS, BOND BASICS FOR TOWNS,
VILLAGES AND CITIEs, supra note 107, at 15 (identifying the principal amount of the bonds
as an “essential component” of a bond resolution); GOODFRIEND & MYERS, BOND BASICS
FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS, supra note 107, at 13 (including the principal amount of the bonds
as an “essential component” of a bond resolution).
222
See supra notes 15–18, and accompanying text for further discussion.
223
For example, under Texas law, any premium used to pay costs of the project financed is
counted against the voter-authorized amount. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1201.042(e) (LexisNexis
2021). I would go further and count any premium generated in, and exclude any original
issue discount from, the calculation, regardless of how the premium is used.
224
Discounts and premiums can make bonds more attractive to investors. Supra notes 17–18
and accompanying text. Other restrictions on selling bonds at a discount or premium would
also need to be eliminated. These restrictions are discussed at infra note 292 and
accompanying text.
225
See supra note 215-16 and accompanying text.
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6.2.2. Limits on Interest Rate or Yield
Some states impose limits on the interest rate or interest cost on
municipal bonds.226 For example, California generally imposes a maximum
interest rate and maximum yield on municipal bonds of 12%.227 Local
governments in Texas generally may not issue bonds with a net effective
interest rate (taking into account original issue premium and discount and
compounding of interest) in excess of 15%. 228 Illinois uses a hybrid approach,
allowing local governments to issue tax-exempt bonds bearing interest at a
rate up to the greater of 9% or 125% of average municipal bond yields and
taxable bonds bearing interest at a rate up to the greater of 13.5% or 200% of
a recent benchmark rate for taxable bonds. 229
Other than perhaps as a negotiating point with lenders, these
requirements do not serve any meaningful purpose. Maximum rates or yields
do not ensure that local governments are paying a fair or appropriate interest
rate on their bonds, but they sometimes may prevent local governments from
borrowing when it would be desirable to do so. Average yields on general
obligation bonds maturing in 20 years and having an average credit rating of
Aa2 (Moody’s) and AA (S&P) have not approached 9% since 1987.230 An
interest rate well below the maximum in California, Illinois or Texas would
have been excessive during the last three decades, absent extraordinary
circumstances.
However, particularly in high interest rate environments, maximum
interest rates or yields expressed as a fixed percentage may restrict desirable
transactions. For example, the California legislature amended its interest rate
and yield caps in 1974, 1980 and 1981 from 7% to 8%, then 10% and 12%
as interest rates rose,231 presumably to keep up with rising interest rates. (The
caps were not subsequently reduced as interest rates declined.)
In 1993, 24 states did. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 4,
at 10; also see Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.4 (noting that most statutes authorizing county
and municipal bonds include maximum interest rates).
227
CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 53531, 53532 (Deering 2021). (There are exceptions. For example,
the limit is 8% for certain general obligation bonds issued by California school districts. CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 15143 (Deering 2021), CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53508.5 (Deering 2021)).
228
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1204.006 (LexisNexis 2021). Computations are set forth in TEX.
GOV’T CODE §§ 1204.003, 1204.004, 1204.005 (LexisNexis 2021).
229
30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 (LexisNexis 2021).
230
WM Financial Strategies, Rates Over Time—Interest Rate Trends,
www.munibondadvisor.com/market.htm [https://perma.cc/P8DL-ATRY] (table entitled 20Bond Buyer Index 1970-Present).
231
CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 53531, 53532 (Deering 2021) (describing the amendments).
Average interest rates climbed from below 6% in 1977 to over 11% in 1981 and 1982 before
declining. WM Financial Strategies, supra note 230, at table entitled 20-Bond Buyer Index
1970-Present.
226
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While they provide more flexibility, even limits tied to benchmark
interest rates (for example published average interest rates on high quality
bonds) may unduly restrict issuers with lower credit ratings (ratings of the
creditworthiness of the issuer). 232 Bonds with lower credit ratings bear
interest at higher rates.233 Credit ratings are based on a variety of factors, such
as the economy, debt, finances and management. 234 A local government bond
issuance may be desirable even if the government has a low credit rating or
has to pay a higher interest rate on its bonds for other reasons, and restricting
the ability of that government to do so without providing an alternative
funding source may further exacerbate existing disparities (for example, if an
economically disadvantaged area is not able to finance school facilities
comparable to those provided in wealthier areas). 235

232

While the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommended that
states consider limits tied to the interest rates on high quality bonds in 1961, two council
members dissented because “State regulation of this nature might make it impossible for
some local governments to borrow for outlays they urgently need.” ADVISORY COMM’N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 77 n.76.
233
See, e.g., Biles, supra note 71, at 1099 (“the differences in interest based upon the ratings
often amount to millions of dollars for municipal treasuries”); John Yinger, Municipal Bond
Ratings and Citizens’ Rights, 12 AM. L. AND ECON. REV. 1, 9-10 (2010) (discussing
academic studies that demonstrate that higher credit ratings lead to lower interest costs); WM
Financial Strategies, supra note 230, at table entitled Municipal Market Data Index 20th Year
Maturity by Rating Grade (showing that interest rates on bonds with lower credit ratings
have been higher than on bonds with higher credit ratings since 2008). Most municipal bonds
are rated by one or more of the three rating agencies that dominate the market: Moody’s
Investors Service, S&P Global Ratings and Fitch Ratings. O’HARA, supra note 16, at 175,
179. See id. at 189 (showing percentage of municipal debt not rated by Moody’s and S&P
ranging from 7.5% in 2000 to 2.4% in 2009). Kroll Bond Rating Agency also rates some
municipal bonds. See Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., Electronic Municipal Market Access
Website, Understanding Credit Ratings, https://emma.msrb.org/EmmaHelp/Understanding
CreditRatings [https://perma.cc/33ZR-FDTM]. Other bonds are not rated. O’HARA, supra
note 16, at 179.
234
Edward A. Rabson, The Role of Rating Agencies, in THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL
BONDS 223, 225 (Sylvan G. Feldstein & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 2008) (quoting Moody’s longterm municipal bonds rating scale).
235
This may be especially true if particular types of communities are disproportionately
affected. For example, one study concluded that smaller communities pay higher interest
rates than larger ones. See Simonsen et al., supra note 81. Another commentator suggests
that credit rating formulae disadvantage cities with large Black and Hispanic populations.
Yinger, supra note 233, at 28-29. Furthermore, to the extent that interest rate limits increase
the importance of credit ratings to local governments, they may increase the risk that credit
rating agencies have too much influence on local government decisions. See generally Biles,
supra note 71 (arguing that local governments prioritize the requirements of credit rating
agencies over the needs of their citizens).
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6.2.3. Regulation of Final Maturity and Amortization
Many states have limits on the final maturity of some or all local
government bonds, and some also regulate the amortization schedule.236
Presumably the intent of these provisions is to prevent today’s
decisionmakers from placing an excessive debt burden on future residents.
6.2.3.1. Forms of Limits on Maturity
Different states have different approaches to establishing final
maturity dates, and the dates sometimes vary depending on the type of bonds
or the type of project. Some states specify a period of years. For example,
general obligation bonds issued by Hawaii counties must mature within 25
years and revenue bonds within 30. 237 General obligation bonds issued by
California local governments must mature within 40 years.238 The maximum
term for many public enterprise revenue bonds in California is 40 years and
for sales tax revenue bonds ranges from 20-50 years depending on the issuer
and the authorizing law (with some instead limited by the term of the tax). 239
New York municipalities and school districts generally may not issue bonds
with a term longer than the “period of probable usefulness” of the project or
projects being financed, and periods of probable usefulness for over 100 types
of projects are included in the Local Finance Law, subject to constitutional
caps.240 Oregon does not specify a maximum term for general obligation
bonds and for some other types of local government borrowing, but instead

Forty-one states had limits on maximum maturities in 1993. ADVISORY COMM’N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 4, at 10. See also Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.4
(noting that many state laws include maximum terms for municipal bonds).
237
HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 13, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-4(b) (LexisNexis 2020).
238
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18(a). Some general obligation bonds have shorter maximum
terms. For example, some California school district bonds must mature within 25 years. CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 53508.5 (Deering 2021), CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15144 (Deering 2021).
239
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54400 (Deering 2021); CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra
note 106, at D-118-21 (2006).
240
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00 (McKinney 2021). Projects
range from more typical ones like water systems, sewer systems, and roads to unique and
specific projects such as payments to certain former employees of the town of Southampton,
Lynbrook and Oyster Bay and payments from the city of Elmira for past service costs due to
the state. Id. Bonds generally cannot be issued for projects that are not included in the statute.
GOODFRIEND & MYERS, BOND BASICS FOR TOWNS, VILLAGES AND CITIES supra note 107, at
21. The periods of probable usefulness and the items that are included are not always
intuitive. For example, replacement vehicles are included but vehicles to expand a fleet are
not; land has a useful life of 30 years; and cleaning of hazardous waste sites in some locations
is included but not in others. Id. at 25-26.
236
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requires that the weighted average life of the bonds be less than or equal to
the weighted average life of the project financed with the bonds.241
6.2.3.2. Provisions Governing Amortization Schedule
Some states also have restrictions on how debt service is spread out
over the life of the bonds. For example, general obligation bonds issued by
Hawaii counties must mature in substantially equal installments and the first
principal payment must be made within 5 years of issuance. 242 In New York,
local government bonds generally must be paid in annual installments
beginning within two years after the bonds are issued, and no installment may
be more than 50% higher than the smallest preceding installment unless the
governing body of the local government provides for substantially level or
declining debt service payments.243 Prior to 2010, California had a law that
required substantially level debt service on many issuances of general
obligation bonds, unless principal was paid faster or if the issuance of bonds
resulted in morel level debt service on all of the local government’s
outstanding general obligation bonds. 244 These restrictions do not always
apply to revenue bonds.245
6.2.3.3. Properly Drafted Restrictions on Maximum Term
and Amortization Can Promote Interperiod Equity
“[I]t is axiomatic that bonds should be retired within the period of
usefulness of the facilities which they have financed and that their retirement
or amortization should begin at an adequate rate with a minimum of delay.” 246
Limits on the period that bonds can be outstanding and provisions restricting
the ability to backload debt service may each serve to effectively
241

OR. CONST. art. XI, § 11L. See also LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, supra note 50, at 10, 13
(noting that some financing agreements and revenue bonds are subject to these limitations).
The weighted average life of bonds is the weighted period of time required to repay half of
the principal of the bonds. It can be calculated by multiplying each principal payment by the
number of years that principal is outstanding, then dividing that result by the total amount of
principal of the bonds. For an example, see Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Average
Life, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/glossary/definition/averagelife.aspx [https://perma.cc/47DW-F5LG] (last updated Jan. 5, 2022).
242
HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 13.
243
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. Because interest payments decline with the outstanding
principal amount, principal payments go up from year to year if debt service (principal and
interest) is the same in every year.
244
Former Cal. Gov’t Code § 253508.5 (1993 Cal ALS 841). The largest annual debt service
payment could not exceed the smallest by more than ten percent. Id.
245
For example, no such restriction applies to Hawaii revenue bonds.
246
NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE (1953), supra note 93, at xviii.
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counterbalance the tendency of current officials to borrow more and for a
longer term than would be consistent with interperiod equity. These
provisions serve separate yet related functions.
Limits on maturity will best promote interperiod equity if they are tied
to the useful life of the facilities financed rather than an arbitrary number of
years. Although allowing local governments to determine the useful life of
the project being financed, or of components of the project being financed,
and tying final maturities to that is daunting, there are ways to make the
process more manageable. It is important that the process be one with a result
that is clear enough for bond counsel to be able to deliver an opinion as to the
validity of the bonds. One alternative would be a statute or regulation
detailing useful lives for various types of projects, along the line of New
York’s periods of probable usefulness. 247 Another option would be to
incorporate the economic lives that are used as “safe harbors” for tax-exempt
bonds.248 Since these are commonly used by local governments and bond
counsel, they should be comfortable working with these for another purpose,
as well. If the state wished to allow local governments some flexibility to
extend debt beyond the safe harbor useful life of the project financed, it could
do so, either by generally providing for a longer period (for example, 120%
of the specified period, like in the federal regulations) and/or by allowing
local governments to amortize over a longer period in certain circumstances
or with the approval of, or following consultation with, a state agency with
relevant expertise. 249 If a state were wary that the safe harbor useful lives
could sometimes be too long, it could impose a shorter period (either a
percentage of the useful life or an outside limit on maximum term). Laws

247

See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
In order for interest on bonds to be excluded from income for federal income tax purposes,
the average maturity) of the bonds cannot exceed 120% of the average reasonably expected
economic life of the assets financed with the proceeds of the bonds absent extenuating
circumstances. 26 U.S.C.A 147(b)(1) (West 2020); Treas. Reg. 1.148-1(c)(4)(B)(2); CAL.
DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at §§ 4.4.1, 4.7.2.3. The safe harbors for
various types of structures and equipment are in two revenue procedures released by the
Internal Revenue Service, Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418 (1962) and Rev. Proc. 83-35,
1983-1 C.B. 745 (1983).
249
David Gamage and Darien Shanske have suggested that the California Debt and
Investment Advisory Commission approve certain types of local debt that they believe are
more likely to be problematic. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Case for a StateLevel Debt-Financing Authority, 67 ST. TAX NOTES 188, 193 (2013). While their suggestion
was not in the context of final maturity of bonds, state agency approval may be appropriate
here because it would provide the opportunity for an agency with more expertise and without
a vested interest in the outcome (unlike an underwriter) to provide guidance. While there is
risk that a state agency could block financings for political reasons or otherwise unduly
restrict the ability of local governments to borrow, in the context of borrowing for a term
longer than the useful life of the project, the risks of involving such an agency seem minimal.
248
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governing maximum maturities and useful lives of projects should be the
same regardless of the type of bond being issued.
Laws that promote front-loaded or fairly level debt service also play
an important role in promoting interperiod equity. They should, however,
provide some flexibility, for several reasons. First, future debt service will be
paid in future dollars, which likely will be worth less than today’s dollars,
and some cushion should be included to account for that. Second, while as a
general rule it makes sense for bonds payable from an established tax or from
rates paid for use of an existing facility to have fairly even payments over the
term of the debt, this is not necessarily true for a new facility or a new stream
of payments. A new facility that is being constructed will not generate
revenues until it is completed, and perhaps will not reach its revenuegenerating potential until some time after completion. Even in the absence of
a new facility, it may take time for a new revenue stream from an existing
facility or from a new tax to reach its full potential. Third, allowing local
governments flexibility to structure new debt service around existing to
provide a smoother structure can assist in avoiding large changes in fee levels
and tax rates, which may create difficulties for taxpayers.250
Fourth, and particularly salient in the midst of a global pandemic,
local governments need the flexibility to deal with economic shocks and
disasters. In a time of economic distress, local governments may need to
structure debt service on new borrowing or refinancing so that a larger
proportion of the debt service is payable in the future than might be ideal for
interperiod equity in order to obtain critically needed funds in a timely
manner and to provide economic relief to citizens. Safety valves could be
built into amortization requirements to address this issue. For example, the
local government might be permitted to deviate from the statutory restrictions
in specified circumstances, such as a natural disaster or a recession, or if the
governing body might be required to make findings with respect to economic
distress. Exceptions of these kinds could be helpful, but risk being abused
and also being too narrow to cover unanticipated circumstances.
While the legislature could amend the law to loosen level debt service
requirements should the need to do so arise, it may not do so (or may not do
so in a timely manner), or the looser requirements may remain in place after
they are no longer desirable. For example, the California legislature
eliminated a requirement of substantially level debt service on many general
obligation bonds in 2009 to give local governments more flexibility during a
time of financial crisis. 251 This change affected the way that local
See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 50, at 693 (noting that “taxpayers find it easier
to live with a more or less stable tax rate”). Such flexibility should have reasonable limits.
251
Assemb. B. 1388 2009-2010 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Cal. Governor’s Office of
Planning and Research, A.B. 1388 Enrolled Bill Report, Reg. Sess., at 3-4 (2009).
250
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governments borrowed even after the crisis had passed. Prior to 2009,
California school districts could issue bonds with a maturity of up to 25 years
without having to provide for substantially level debt service; after the
legislature acted in 2009, they could issue bonds with a maturity of up to 40
years without having to meet that requirement. In the years after the
amendment passed, a significantly higher portion of the capital appreciation
bonds (on which all or nearly all debt service is paid close to maturity) issued
by California school districts had maturities in excess of 25 years, increasing
from 24% in 2009 to 80% in 2012 before declining to 58% by 2015 (still
significantly higher than prior to the change ). 252
Perhaps a better alternative would be allowing a state agency to waive
the statutory restrictions in appropriate circumstances,253 or allowing a local
government to proceed with a financing with significantly higher debt service
in later years if the government’s governing body makes findings of necessity
and is given nonbinding guidance of a state agency or other entity with
expertise.254
6.2.4. Restrictions on Other Provisions
States sometimes impose other restrictions on the provisions of
bonds. For example, some California school district general obligation bonds
must be subject to redemption at the option of the issuer beginning not later
than 10 years after the date they were issued. 255 Historically, some states
required that bonds be issued in coupon form (meaning that whomever held
a “coupon” for an interest payment would be paid the interest) rather than
registered form (in which payments are made to the registered owner of the
bond), but once the U.S. Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to

252

See White, supra note 14, at 409 n. 225.
See supra note 249.
254
The nonprofit organization proposed in Ang & Green, supra note 19, to (among other
things) establish best practices, provide independent advice to issuers and disseminate
information could fulfill this role.
255
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15144.2 (Deering 2021). This applies to capital appreciation bonds
with maturities in excess of ten years. Id. While this right to redeem gives school districts
greater flexibility to refinance at better interest rates or a preferable structure, it presumably
comes at a cost in the form of higher yields, particularly when interest rates are high, since
it creates the risk that investors will have to reinvest not only earning on but also principal
of the CABs in lower yielding securities before the scheduled maturity date of the CABs.
These requirements may become more costly should the market move away from 10-year
par calls in the future.
253
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provide that tax-exempt bonds had to be in registered form, states modified
their laws to allow for registered bonds. 256
Most states “prescribe by statute bond terms that can be said to affect
policy . . . but give local governing bodies a good deal of discretion in setting
bond terms of an administrative nature.” 257 In general, this provides
appropriate flexibility to local governments to determine the terms of their
bonds and adapt to changing market conditions that are not likely to create
substantial risks to current or future citizens. Bond laws could either simply
state that local government governing bodies and their delegees can
determine terms of the bonds other than any specified by law, or could
include a list of the types of terms that local governments may want to include
in their bond documents along with flexibility to include other terms. 258 For
particular practices that cause concern, 259 states may want to consider
whether education of local government officials, requiring local governments
to work with an experienced municipal advisor that has a fiduciary duty to
the local government, mandating consultation with or approval by a state
agency or other entity with expertise, or legislative prohibition are
appropriate.260
Bond laws typically authorize local government issuers to make
agreements with lenders regarding the collection and use of revenues,
creation of security interests, establishment of reserve fund and other
matters.261 These covenants are important to bondholders, particularly those
of revenue bonds, but they restrict the issuer’s flexibility. However, local
governments may not always understand the terms to which they are
agreeing.262 As a result, these covenants may prove harmful to current or
future citizens. Because covenants vary significantly, legislating the types of
covenants that are and are not appropriate is not a reasonable solution. Better
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 1.1.2; Bernard P. Friel, The
Model Registered Public Obligations Act: A Brief History, 16 Urb. L. 17, 24–25 (1984);
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.44.
257
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.35.
258
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE 53508 (Deering 2021) (listing several items that “may” be
addressed in the resolution, including “other terms and conditions of the bonds and of their
execution, issuance, and sale deemed necessary and appropriate ….”).
259
Some candidates would be auction rate securities (described in Section 3.3) or other types
of transactions in which a local government bears a disproportionately high risk in exchange
for a relatively small reward. Lori Raineri and Darien Shanske make this argument in Raineri
& Shanske, supra note 68.
260
Raineri and Shanske urge the use of a state agency that would monitor local government
borrowing for asymmetric risk. Id. at 83. For additional discussion of municipal advisors,
see supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. Also see supra notes 249 and 254.
261
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.45. Also see supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text
for description of some other common covenants.
262
See, e.g., Nguyen et al., supra note 40, at 1 (noting that local governments may not fully
comprehend loan risks); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
256

Vol. 7:2]

Beyond a “Bond-Aid” Approach

375

options would be providing access to guidance from a state agency or other
entity with expertise at a reasonable cost or at the very least making trainings
and other materials available to local governments so they can better educate
themselves. Requiring local governments to use a municipal advisor, which
would have a fiduciary duty to the local government and have needed
expertise, is another option.
6.3. Refinancing
Most states allow local governments to issue bonds and to repay
outstanding debt prior to maturity. 263 This is referred to as “refunding,” the
bonds being repaid are referred to as “refunded bonds”, and the bonds being
issued to repay them are referred to as “refunding bonds.” The most common
reason for refunding is to take advantage of lower interest rates. 264
Sometimes, issuers refund outstanding bonds to eliminate or modify
covenants that have become unduly burdensome or to restructure debt
service.265 Due to the severe economic strain caused by the COVID-19
pandemic, some local governments have refinanced outstanding debt to
provide short-term relief by deferring debt service. 266
In some states, refunding bonds must satisfy certain requirements, or
refunding bonds that would otherwise require voter approval (such as general
obligation bonds) do not need such approval if specific requirements are met.
For example, in New York, refundings generally must result in present value
savings and refunding bonds generally cannot mature later than the end of the
period of probable usefulness of the project financed, computed from the
same date as for the refunded bonds. 267 California local governments may
issue general obligation bonds to refund other general obligation bonds
without obtaining a new voter approval only if the total amount of debt
service through maturity is lower for the refunding bonds than for the
refunded bonds and the refunding bonds mature no later than the refunded

263

Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.50.
William H. Wood, Municipal Bond Refundings, in THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS
235, 236 (Sylvan G. Feldstein & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 2008).
265
Id. at 236–37; O’HARA, supra note 16, at 83; LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES, supra note 50, at 17.
266
See State and Local Governments Relied on Debt for Budgetary Help in 2020, PEW
CHARITABLE T RUST (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2021/01/28/state-and-local-governments-relied-on-debt-for-budgetaryhelp-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/WC4W-WMP2] (interview with Matt Fabian and Lisa
Washburn) (noting that although this practice historically has not been common, some local
governments did this in response to the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic).
267
N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW §§ 90.00, 90.10 (McKinney 2021). See supra note 240 and
accompanying text for discussion of periods of probable usefulness.
264
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bonds.268 Other states are somewhat less restrictive. Oregon allows refunding
bonds to be issued without voter approval as long as the maturity of the
refunding bonds does not exceed any maturity limit imposed on the refunded
bonds by the voters or by law by more than six months.269
States generally limit the amount of refunding bonds to the amount
necessary to repay the refunded bonds and pay costs of issuance. 270 In
addition, some states have other restrictions on the issuance of refunding
bonds. For example, in Oregon, any refunding bonds that are issued more
than a year in advance of the repayment of existing bonds must be approved
by the State Treasurer’s office and are subject to additional requirements. 271
Among other things, the State Treasurer’s regulations require that local
governments use a municipal advisor for any such advance refundings.272
Allowing local governments to refinance outstanding debt allows
them to save money when they can refinance at lower interest rates and
provides flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances by eliminating
restrictive covenants in bond documents or restructuring debt service in
challenging times. As long as the transaction does not increase the overall
burden on taxpayers and as long as the term of the new bonds is not
significantly longer than would have been legally allowed for the initial
bonds and any level debt service requirements that applied to the refunded
bonds also apply to the refunding bonds, present and future citizens are not
likely to be harmed by a refinancing. Furthermore, because it takes several
months to obtain voter approval,273 requiring such approval for refunded
bonds would make it impossible for a local government to act quickly to take
advantage of interest rate fluctuations, preventing some local governments
from achieving debt service savings. That said, it may be sensible to require
consultation with a state agency or other expert, state agency approval or use
of a municipal advisor with a fiduciary duty to the local government issuer,
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53552, 53553(e) (Deering 2021). Georgia similarly exempts
refunding bonds from voter authorization requirements as long as the term is not extended,
the interest rate is not increased, and debt service through maturity does not increase. GA.
CONST. art. IX, § 5(III).
269
OR. REV. STATS. §§ 287A.360, 287A.365 (2019).
270
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.50. While California law does not expressly do so, the
California Attorney General has interpreted the refunding statute to allow refunding general
obligation bonds without voter approval only if proceeds for other purposes are not generated
and noted that view is consistent with case law in other jurisdictions. Opinion of Edmund G.
Brown Jr., Att’y Gen., No. 06-1102 8-9 (Jan. 9, 2009).
271
OR. REV. STATS. §§ 287A.001(1); 287A.365-287A.375 (2019). The additional
requirements are likely because advance refundings are more costly than current ones
because the proceeds of the refunding bonds must cover interest through the date the
refunded bonds are to be paid.
272
OR. ADMIN. R. 170-062-0000(2) (2021).
273
See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
268
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or to require a local government governing body to make findings as to the
benefits of the transaction in some circumstances, such as refinancings that
do not result in debt service savings or that defer a significant portion of debt
service.
6.4. Regulation of Sale of Bonds
6.4.1. Method of Sale
Some states restrict the method of sale for at least some bonds. For
example, some states require some or all local governments to sell their
general obligation bonds (but not revenue bonds) through a competitive
process.274 General obligation bonds may be sold on a negotiated basis in
other states.275 Some states also allow local governments to privately sell
bonds to, and to borrow directly from, financial institutions, and this practice
is becoming increasingly common. 276 Most local government debt is sold in
negotiated sales.277
Some states impose additional requirements for bonds to be sold on a
negotiated basis. For example, California local governments selling general
obligation bonds on a negotiated basis must include a statement of the reasons
for selecting a negotiated method of sale and an estimate of the costs of
issuance in the governing body resolution that authorizes the bonds. 278 For
revenue bonds and refunding bonds, California local governments must
disclose in a filing with the California Debt Investment Advisory
Commission the reason for using a negotiated sale. 279 In New York, some
local governments must obtain the approval of the State Comptroller before

274

Peng et al., supra note 42, at 52–53 (citing Jun Peng & Peter Brucato Jr., Do CompetitiveOnly Laws Have an Impact on the Borrowing Cost of Municipal Bonds?, MUN. FIN. J. 22
(2001)); also see Darío Cestau, Richard C. Green, Burton Hollifield & Norman Schürhoff,
The Cost Burden of Negotiated Sale Restrictions: A Natural Experiment Using Heterogenous
State Laws 1 (Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings, Working Paper
No. 36, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/wp363.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RM49-RNNL] (noting that some states do not allow school districts to use
negotiated sales).
275
See, e.g., OR. REV. STATS. § 287A.300 (2019); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53508.9 (Deering
2021).
276
See supra note 40.
277
Peng et al., supra note 42, at 62.
278
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15146(b)(1) (Deering 2021); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53508.9 (Deering
2021).
279
See Cal. Debt & Inv. Advisory Comm’n, Reason for Negotiated Refunding / Reason for
Negotiated Sale of Revenue Bonds Report, https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/reporting/
reason-refunding-sale-bonds-instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/H84C-M8M7](last visited
Mar. 31, 2021).
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selling some bonds privately or in a negotiated sale. 280 In determining
whether to approve the sale, the State Comptroller considers factors including
the reasonableness of the underwriter’s fee, costs, bond yields, refunding
savings, any derivatives (such as interest rate swaps) related to the
transaction.281
Each method of sale has advantages and disadvantages. Negotiated
sales provide greater flexibility to adjust the transaction structure and timing
as market conditions change and permit greater underwriter involvement in
structuring the transaction and preparing the offering document. 282
Competitive sales eliminate the risk of negotiating unfavorable terms with
the underwriters (either because of corruption or lack of experience) because
bonds are awarded to the lowest bidder in an open bidding process. Numerous
studies suggest that local governments obtain lower yields and pay lower
costs when they sell their bonds competitively, though others reach the
opposite conclusion.283 Generally, negotiated sales are recommended for
complex transactions, new issuers, or complicated credits, while competitive
sales are recommended for higher rated issuers with straight-forward
security.284
Presumably, restrictions on method of sale are intended to ensure that
local governments get the lowest possible yields on their bonds and do not
pay excessive compensation to underwriters. Ideally, rather than blanket
restrictions on methods of sale, states will allow local governments to select
the method of sale that best suits their needs. At the very least, states should
280

N.Y. State Comptroller, Office of the State Comptroller Debt Issuance Approval Policy
Statement and Guidelines, 1 (amended July 1, 2020), available at https://www.osc.state.ny.
us/files/debt/pdf/debt-policy-statement-and-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR8L-BBYJ].
281
Id. at 4–5.
282
Peng et al., supra note 42, at 56–57; see also CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N,
supra note 106, at 10–12 (describing the roles played by an underwriter in a competitive and
a negotiated sale).
283
See Peng et al., supra note 42, at 59–62 (describing some studies that indicate that
competitive sales are most cost effective and others indicating that in some circumstances
negotiated sales may result in better pricing); WM Financial Strategies, Studies Pertaining
to Competitive and Negotiated Sales, (Nov. 2013), http://www.munibondadvisor.com/
SaleStudies.htm [https://perma.cc/8BBU-PQ5K] (describing studies reaching various
conclusions); Cestau, supra note 274 (concluding that prohibition of negotiated sales
increases the yields on bonds maturing within 20 years and decrease the yields on bonds with
longer maturities); Simonsen et al., supra note 81, at 714–15 (indicating that competitive
sales lead to lower interest rates on bonds).
284
CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at §5.3.1; LEAGUE OF OR. CITIES,
supra note 50, at 26; Gov’t Fin. Officers Assoc., Selecting and Managing the Method of Sale
of Bonds, https://www.gfoa.org/materials/selecting-and-managing-the-method-of-sale-ofbonds [https://perma.cc/KGB7-W7J7]; WM Financial Strategies, Bond Sale Methods
(Competitive v Negotiated Bond Sales), http://www.munibondadvisor.com/SaleChoice.htm
[https://perma.cc/3H4B-3A9P].
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allow local governments to sell revenue bonds and refunding bonds without
using competitive bidding since these transactions tend to be more complex
or more time-sensitive.285 Rather than prohibiting negotiated sales of general
obligation bonds or borrowing from financial institutions, a state could
require a local government’s governing body to make findings about the
reasons a negotiated sale or private borrowing was being pursued, or could
require use of a municipal advisor or consultation with or approval of a state
agency or other expert before undertaking the transaction. Other options
would include making available guidance from a state agency or other entity
with expertise at a reasonable cost or requiring local governments to use a
municipal advisor for negotiated sales of general obligation bonds.
States also might want to encourage the use of a competitive process
involving obtaining proposals from several underwriters to select
underwriters for a negotiated sale, or even make available technical support
to assist with such a process.286 Selecting underwriters for negotiated sales
using a competitive process has significantly reduced the underwriting costs
paid by issuers.287
6.4.2. Mechanics of Sale
Some state laws include detailed provisions about the mechanics of
competitive sales, in particular, such as when and where notice of sale must
be published and what the notice must contain. 288 Some of these provisions,
such as requirements to publish in newspapers in particular cities, 289 seem
almost quaint today when competitive bidding takes place through electronic
platforms.290 In all likelihood, some requirements that seem reasonable today
will be obsolete in the future as technology and market practices evolve.
Ideally, any specifics about notice, method of submission of bids and the like
285

See Peng et al., supra note 42, at 63–64 (noting that revenue bonds tend to be riskier and
investors may need more information about them, and that refunding bond sales are more
time-sensitive).
286
The Government Finance Officials Association recommends using a competitive process
to select underwriters for negotiated sales. Gov’t Fin. Officers Assoc., supra note 284. For
descriptions of this process, see CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at
§5.3; Peng et al., supra note 42, at 55–56.
287
Peng et al., supra note 42, at 55–56.
288
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.40.
289
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTILITIES CODE § 22784 (Deering 2021) (requiring that the board of
supervisors publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the county, or if there
isn’t one, in a different county, before selling bonds); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-7-2252 (2019)
(requiring publication of notice of sale in a local newspaper and providing the option to also
publish in a financial newspaper in New York or Chicago).
290
For example, one bidding platform indicates that it is used by the top 30 underwriters.
IPREO, Competitive Bid Calculation System, https://www.newissuehome.i-deal.com/
Destination/docs/BiDCOMP.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4HN-T52N].
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would be drafted in general terms (for example, requiring notices of sale to
be published in a manner (including online) that is reasonably expected to
reach prospective bidders) 291 or delegated to a state agency that can more
easily revise regulations to adapt to changing technology and market
practices. The alternative is unnecessary expense and complication.
Some states prohibit the sale of general obligation bonds at a discount
or limit the amount of discount that is allowed. 292 These laws presumably are
intended to prevent local governments from selling bonds at a yield that is
higher than (or substantially higher than) the authorized maximum interest
rate. A better solution would be to authorize a maximum yield (or, better yet,
to eliminate any maximum interest rate or yield imposed by state law), and
to allow local governments to sell at a discount or premium in order to obtain
the best price on their bonds. 293
7. THE APPROVAL PROCESS, INFORMATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
One of the key functions of bond laws is to ensure that governing
bodies and the public have access to information about proposed bond
issuances and existing debt, and that the public has a meaningful opportunity
to influence proposed local government borrowing. Much of the information
provided to the public and the public’s opportunity to provide input outside
the voter approval process occurs on the context of governing body approval.
All states require governing body approval (or that of a delegate of the
governing body) of bond issuances,294 some require supermajority approval.
Some states also require that issuers provide information to a central
repository or otherwise make information about debt readily available to
those interested. Governing body approval and information requirements are
discussed in the following sections. As with voter approval requirements, if
governing body approval and information requirements are imposed, they
should be applied consistently so that decisions about financings are made on
the basis of the needs of the community rather than the challenge of meeting
the requirements.
7.1. Supermajority Approval
For example, California allows publication of a notice of sale in “a financial publication
generally circulated throughout the state or reasonably expected to be disseminated among
prospective bidders for the securities.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53692 (Deering 2021). This
could be expanded to include online platforms.
292
Salsich, supra note 60, at § § 12.43. See also N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 57.00(e) (McKinney
2021) (limiting the discount to no more than five percent except in specified circumstances).
293
See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text and Section 6.2.2.
294
Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.2.
291
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Some state laws require that a supermajority of a local government’s
governing body approve certain bond issuances, with different definitions of
supermajority in different cases. 295 Supermajority requirements may help
protect against unwise borrowing by making it more difficult for “small but
well-organized groups to put together the legislative coalition necessary to
authorize new debt.”296 A supermajority requirement may also signal to the
governing body that the decision to borrow is a particularly important one,
and that in itself may have value. While at least one study has suggested that
legislative supermajority approval requirements do not reduce the level of
debt,297 it is possible that the requirements caused the debt to be more
carefully considered.
7.2. Requirements for Information and Findings Before Issuance
Some states require that specific information be provided to
governing body members or made publicly available before bonds are
approved, or that governing bodies make specific findings in their resolutions
authorizing bonds. For example, before authorizing the issuance of bonds,
governing bodies of California local governments must obtain and disclose
estimates of the expected yield on the bonds, the costs of issuance, the
proceeds to be received and the total amount of debt service that will need to
be paid to maturity.298 The purpose of this requirement, which was added in
2017, is to provide the public with a better understanding of the financial
impact of the financing.299
At least in states that have laws requiring that meetings of local
government governing bodies must be properly noticed and open to the
public (“open meeting laws”), 300 requirements to present information to the
295

For example, New York local governments generally may issue bonds only if the
transaction is approved by two-thirds of the membership of the governing body (or threefifths if a referendum is being held). N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 33.00 (McKinney 2021). Twothirds of council members of California non-home rule cities must approve an ordinance to
put a general obligation bond measure on the ballot, and some California local transportation
authority boards must approve the issuance of sales tax bonds by a two-thirds vote. CAL.
DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 106, at 139, 195.
296
Sterk & Goldman, supra note 73, at 1366.
297
Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 119, at 76. This study was of state legislatures, not local
governments, but it is reasonable to think that the impact would be the same at the local level.
298
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 5852.1 (Deering 2021).
299
Cal. S. Rules Comm., Senate Floor Analysis, SB 450, 5 (Cal. 2017) (quoting the bill’s
author). Similarly, some local government governing bodies in California must make
specific findings and include costs of issuance information in the authorizing governing body
resolution in order to sell general obligation bonds at a negotiated sale. See supra note 278
and accompanying text.
300
Most states have such laws. MCQUILLIN, supra note 57, at § 13.11.
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governing body and for the governing body to make findings can serve dual
purposes of informing the governing board and informing the public. While
it is safe to assume that few members of the public attend local government
board meetings or review meeting agendas on local government web sites,
there is value in having the information available to anyone who wants to see
it, and interest groups and the press may bring attention to more controversial
measures. Mandating wider publication of a notice with key information
about the financing in advance of the meeting might garner more public
attention, notwithstanding that it is likely that most people do not read the
public notices published in their local newspaper. However, requirements
should be as straightforward as possible and should be limited to information
that is meaningful to members of the governing board and the public.
Otherwise, the requirements may simply impose unnecessary costs and create
another opportunity for error while providing little benefit.
7.3. Opportunities for Public Discussion and Waiting Periods
In addition to open meeting laws, some states provide specific
opportunities for public discussion, or require a waiting period before bonds
are issued to ensure that the public has the opportunity to provide input. 301
For example, Illinois law requires that local governments hold at least one
public hearing after giving public notice of the hearing before authorizing
some types of bonds that do not require voter approval. 302 For some bonds,
California requires school districts to provide notice and present the
resolution authorizing the bonds at two consecutive governing body meetings
and it can be adopted only at the second one, 303 in effect giving a longer
period in which members of the public can comment on the proposed
issuance. Requirements to give public notice and to give the public a period
of time and the opportunity to provide input (whether that is in the context of
a regular governing body meeting or otherwise) could promote public
engagement and increase the likelihood that government officials hear
varying viewpoints in the community before making a final decision to issue
bonds, or at least before the bonds are issued. The Internal Revenue Code
takes a similar approach, requiring that a public hearing after notice for some
(but not all) tax-exempt bonds.304
7.4. Additional Information Requirements and Other Accountability
Measures
301

Some examples appear in Salsich, supra note 60, at § 12.18.
30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 352 (LexisNexis 2021).
303
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15146(b)(2) (Deering 2021). This only applies to capital appreciation
bonds.
304
26 U.S.C.A. § 147(f)(2)(B)(i) (West 2020); Treas. Reg. 1-147(f)-1(a)-(d).
302
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Some states require reporting of bond issuance data to a state agency
or otherwise require that the information be made accessible to the public.
For example, every time a California local government issues bonds, it must
provide information to the California Debt and Investment Advisory
Commission (“CDIAC”) about the issuance, including the principal amount
of the bonds, premium and discount on the bonds, maturity schedule, purpose
of the bonds, type of bonds, method of sale, identity of outside professionals
and fees paid to them.305 Local governments in California also must annually
file with CDIAC information about outstanding debt and debt issued and paid
during the preceding year.306 CDIAC provides aggregate information about
statewide debt issuances and also makes available information about
individual issuances in excel on its web site. 307 Other states also collect and
publish information about local government borrowing.308 While information
about publicly sold debt is available on the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board’s Electronic Municipal Market Access website, the information on that
site is prepared for investors and does not include all of the information that
might be of interest to, or provide information in the format that would be
most usable by, citizens or to other local governments.309 States that do not
collect and provide information should consider doing so and states that
already collect information should evaluate whether it would be valuable to
collect additional data. A state could form a working group that includes
representatives of local governments, municipal advisors, and taxpayer
organizations to evaluate what information would be useful and could be
proved at a reasonable cost. States also could consider collaborating so that
information from multiple states was available in a single database. While
reporting requirements create additional work and cost for local governments,
and compliance may not be perfect, this information is valuable not only to
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8855(i), (j) (Deering 2021); CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 4, § 6020
(Barclays 2021).
306
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8855(k) (Deering 2021).
307
See generally California State and Local Government Debt Issuance Data, CALIFORNIA
STATE TREASURER'S OFFICE, https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/debt.asp [https://perma.cc/
F7CM-XLSR].
308
Numerous states collect and publish information about local government debt. The
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission found in 2007 that 17 states had some
form of state and/or local government debt data on their web sites. Cal. Debt & Inv. Advisory
Comm’n, State and Local Government Debt Data Resources (CDIAC No. 07-08) 1 (2007).
309
The site is called “emma.msrb.org” [https://perma.cc/8S2V-VGBG]. It generally includes
disclosure information required to be provided for municipal bonds under federal securities
laws. For example, official statements posted on the site do not typically include detailed
information about fees charged by individual service providers involved in a transaction; this
information may be useful to other local governments. In addition, because one has to look
at official statements for separate transactions individually, it is not as easy to compare terms
of issuances and issuers.
305
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researchers and by the state, but also by citizens and by other local
governments who may want to compare their issuance costs and bond yields
to those of others.310
8. SO, WHAT NOW?
This article has discussed some of the typical elements of bond laws
and different ways that states have addressed them. It also has identified
problems with some bond laws and proposed solutions. States have several
options for improving bond laws and local government borrowing practices.
These options range from a wholesale revision of the bond law to providing
additional support and guidance to local governments. Several options are
discussed below.
8.1. Changing the Law
8.1.1. Wholesale Revision or Even a New Model Bond Law
Ideally, states would consider revamping their bond laws entirely to
ensure consistency and clarity while providing needed flexibility and updates.
An organization like the National Association of Bond Lawyers or the
National League of Cities could even undertake the drafting of model bond
laws similar to what the National Municipal League did in the 1950s and
1960s311 or similar to the Uniform Commercial Code or other laws that have
been adopted in numerous states, though these options may prove unduly
challenging, particularly where constitutional provisions need to be amended
or where there is a wide range in approaches among different states.
Harmonizing a new set of model bond laws with existing laws that are spread
throughout numerous statutes and codes, as is the case in many states, 312 also
may be challenging.
8.1.2. Incremental Change
As an alternative to a wholesale revision of bond laws, states could
evaluate specific aspects of their bond laws and make changes to those
provisions. Similarly, national organizations could prepare and promote
uniform versions of laws to change particular aspects of municipal bond law.
For example, when federal law was changed so that municipal bonds had to
310

See Joffe, supra note 219, at 15–16 (noting that making costs of issuance more visible is
the first step towards reducing them).
311
See generally note 93.
312
See generally note 85.
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be in registered form in order to be tax exempt, representatives of several
organizations worked together to develop a model law permitting local
governments to issue bonds in registered form, and at least 20 states adopted
the model law entirely or in part. 313 It may be simplest to make amendments
to laws that relate to specific terms of bonds and mechanics of issuance and
sale rather than to voter approval requirements or debt limits. Another
alternative would be to delegate requirements regarding issuance and sale
mechanics and terms of bonds to a state agency so that provisions can be
changed more easily as circumstances warrant, and even to allow local
governments to deviate from some or all those requirements either after
approval by the state agency or after consultation with the agency or another
expert.
8.1.3. Consolidation
In most states, bond laws are scattered throughout numerous statutes
and codes.314 Even if no substantive changes to the laws are made,
consolidating them in a single location would be valuable. Consolidation
“would expose more fully the widespread existence of overlapping and
contradictory provisions which have tended to hamper sound financial
administration by local governments and to limit the ability of State
legislatures to deal intelligently with this subject.” 315 Consolidation would
also make it easier for bond counsel and other professionals both within and
outside local governments to understand what the laws are that apply to a
particular issuance. Having statutes spread throughout multiple codes
increases the risk of inadvertent noncompliance. It likely also increases the
cost of compliance because of the time and effort involved in ensuring that
all relevant provisions are considered or, where there is ambiguity, complying
with provisions that may not be intended to apply to a particular transaction.
Consolidation, or at least partial consolidation, is achievable. For example,
Texas consolidated its bond laws in 1999. 316
8.1.4. Proceeding Carefully
Laws governing local government borrowing are complex, and they
intersect with state laws regarding matters such as fiscal distress and
municipal bankruptcy, the imposition of taxes and fees, open meeting laws
and election laws. To avoid unintended consequences or disconnects with
313

See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
See generally note 85.
315
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., supra note 50, at 85.
316
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
314
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other bodies of law, amendments to bond laws should be made carefully. For
example, when Texas consolidated its bond law in 1999, it involved public
finance attorneys and the head of the public finance division of the office of
the attorney general to review and provide comments on the proposed
legislation and widely distributed drafts of the proposed law for comment. 317
Oregon also involved numerous public finance professionals (lawyers and
finance professionals, both from private practice and governments) in the
drafting of its 2007 revised bond law.318 The Oregon bill also allowed Oregon
local governments to use existing law for two years after the act became
effective in order to “protect . . . local government borrowers against the
possibility that the substantial revisions to existing law in this very large bill
have adverse unintended consequences.” 319 This gave the legislature time to
address any problems of which it became aware during that two year period
before any local government could be harmed.
In addition, additional research may be needed to inform discussion
of some issues. For example, if permissive referenda are being considered, it
would be valuable to know more about how the petition requirements and
timing limitations affect the likelihood that citizens can actually require a
measure to be on the ballot.
8.2. Other Alternatives: Education and Guidance
Even absent any revisions to the law, there are things states can do to
improve the situation. For example, in its 2019 Debt Financing Guide,
CDIAC includes a list of all of the general bond statutes.320 This list, together
with the information provided in the guide, is very valuable. States also can
(and do) provide training and educational resources to local governments
through entities like CDIAC and the Oregon Municipal Debt Advisory
Commission.321 States that don’t provide these resources should consider
doing so or should consider supporting academic institutions and other
organizations within the state that do.
States also could provide support to local governments in other ways,
such as providing support services to local governments that could be
317

Tex. Office of House Bill Analysis, Bill Analysis, H.B. 3157 (July 15, 1999).
Rogers, supra note 86, at § 1.
319
Id. at § 4.M.
320
See generally CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22, at App. A.6.
321
See, e.g., Cal. Debt and Inv. Advisory Comm’n, 2020 Debt Issuance and Public
Investment Webinars, Seminars and Conferences, https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/
seminars/2020/index.asp [https://perma.cc/9LLT-6SGN] (listing its 2020 training events);
Or. State Treasury, Oregon Bond Education Center, https://www.oregon.gov/treasury/
public-financial-services/pages/oregon-bond-education-center.aspx [https://perma.cc/V3J9DB7W] (providing educational materials about bond issuance). See also generally CAL.
DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 22.
318
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accessed for a reasonable fee at the option of the local government or
collaborating with a nonprofit organization that would provide this
assistance.322 States could take this a step farther and encourage or require
use of these services for particularly complex or problematic transactions.
9. CONCLUSION
As we look for ways to revive the economy and to move beyond (or
at least move forward despite) the COVID-19 pandemic, local government
borrowing is likely to play a significant role. We need to do what we can now
to make sure that borrowing is done in an effective and efficient way, and
that local governments receive the guidance they need but are not constrained
by outdated or unduly complicated mechanics. The first step to that is a robust
dialogue about how state bond laws can be improved. The second step is
determining whether in a particular state wholesale revision is realistic, or
more circumspect objectives such as consolidation or revision of a particular
aspect of bond laws are more achievable. It is time to start that conversation.

322

Such an organization was suggested in Ang & Green, supra note 19. See supra note 254
for a very brief description of the organization they proposed.
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